

CLIMATE WINDOW - REQUEST RESPONSE

Rapid Situational Analysis: Jamaica Education Sector Hurricane Melissa Response

REQUEST SUBMISSION

Following the devastation caused by Hurricane Melissa—a Category 5 storm that struck Jamaica on 28 October 2025—this request sought a rapid situational analysis of the hurricane’s impact on the country’s education sector, particularly in the hardest-hit western parishes. With over 600 schools damaged and approximately 150,000 students facing severe disruption, the analysis aimed to examine the effects on infrastructure, learning continuity, child protection risks, and psychosocial well-being. It also intended to identify gaps in donor knowledge, map ongoing response efforts, and highlight the importance of safe schools and integrated support systems in recovery.

In response, this assessment provides an interim, actionable overview to inform immediate decision-making and guide strategic engagement. It outlines key findings from desk review and stakeholder consultations, and offers recommendations to inform a Building Back Better education strategy. The response emphasises coordination among government, donors, and NGOs, and integrates priorities such as violence prevention, gender sensitivity, and psychosocial support. While not a substitute for the forthcoming UNESCO-led Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, this analysis plays a critical role in shaping early recovery efforts and identifying areas where targeted international support, including from the UK, can add value.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CAPRI	Caribbean Policy Research Institute
CAPE	Caribbean Advanced Proficiency Examination
CERC	Contingent Emergency Response Component
CSEC	Caribbean Secondary Education Certificate
CXC	Caribbean Examinations Council
CHASE Fund	Culture, Health, Arts, Sports and Education Fund
DaLA	Damage and Loss Assessment
DRF	Disaster Risk Financing
ECI	Early Childhood Institution
EMIS	Education Management Information System
ERICC	Education Research in Conflict and Protracted Crisis (ERICC)
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (UK)
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GRADE	Global Rapid Post-Disaster Damage Estimation
IAD	Inter-American Dialogue
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
JETC	Jamaica Education Transformation Commission
JISA	Jamaica Independent Schools Association
JSIF	Jamaica Social Investment Fund
JTA	Jamaica Teachers Association
JYAN	Jamaica Youth Advocacy Network
MoESYI	Ministry of Education, Skills, Youth and Information
NARA	National Reconstruction and Resilience Authority
NET	National Education Trust
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODPEM	Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management
PATH	Programme of Advancement Through Health and Education
PEP	Primary Exit Profile
PIOJ	Planning Institute of Jamaica
PSS	Psychosocial Support
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VAWG	Violence Against Women and Girls
VPP	UK-Jamaica Violence Prevention Partnership
WFP	World Food Programme

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the findings of a rapid situational analysis of Hurricane Melissa's impact on Jamaica's education sector, conducted from 24 February through 19 March 2026. It was commissioned to examine the country's education sector response to Hurricane Melissa, with particular attention to educational continuity, child protection, violence against women and girls (VAWG), and coordination and financing, with a lens on resilience building. It draws on ~30 key informant interviews conducted with key stakeholders in Kingston and the western parishes, as well as a structured desk review of existing analyses and reports. A comprehensive Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) has been commissioned by UNESCO at MoESYI's request (release date to be determined), while other more comprehensive assessments are also underway; this rapid situational analysis is predominantly qualitative in nature and intended to inform near-term decision-making.

Hurricane Melissa made landfall on 28 October 2025 as a Category 5 storm, causing the most severe natural disaster in Jamaica's recorded history. In early March, the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) released estimates from the Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) of total hurricane-related losses at USD 12.2 billion, or more than 50 percent of anticipated GDP. Initial government estimates of the education sector suggest direct losses of approximately JMD 30 billion: 447 schools were severely damaged, at least 152,000 students' school years were disrupted, 8,000 teachers were impacted, and the western and central parishes comprising education regions 3, 4, and 5 experienced extended closures and displacement along with the broader socio-economic and environmental devastation left in the wake of the storm.

An important finding of this assessment is that Hurricane Melissa did not create many of the vulnerabilities now visible in Jamaica's education system, but rather exposed and amplified fault lines that predate the storm by years. In the time prior to October 2025, only 1 in 5 secondary students passed sufficient CSEC subjects to be eligible for college; the country scored below global averages in all three OECD PISA domains; and almost no rural students reached "high proficiency" in any PISA subject. At the primary level, a third of students completing primary school could not read and 56 percent could not write. The Jamaica Education Transformation Commission (JETC) had diagnosed and proposed operational solutions to the learning, administrative, and governance problems in 2022 through the landmark "Patterson report." Hurricane Melissa arrived as a compound shock layered on top of COVID-19, Hurricane Beryl in 2024, and economic pressure on the poorest households of the island's western parishes. A deeper question on the minds of many interviewed for this report is whether the political will and international attention generated by a major disaster can catalyse new reform rather than a restoration of the status quo.

With that in mind, the Government of Jamaica rallied partners and handled the initial education response with urgency, and by 14 January 2026, all public schools had returned to some form of operation. In coordination with the concurrent humanitarian initiatives, MoESYI coordinated a complex, multi-actor response under extraordinary pressure and with limited resources. Teachers in the western parishes showed up, improvised, and kept schooling alive under extraordinary conditions. The church school networks activated immediately and effectively, and civil society organisations demonstrated a capacity to scale rapidly that many comparable contexts cannot match. These achievements deserve recognition.

The nominal opening of schools, however, does not fully address the many remaining gaps that will require sustained attention from government, donors, partners, and communities working together. A reported ~1,500 students across Regions 4 and 5 are absent from school rosters with no confirmed status, including a reported ~1,000 in Region 4 alone. A number of schools in Hanover and

Westmoreland were still serving as shelters for displaced persons as late as early March 2026. The national school feeding programme, the single most important pull factor for attendance, had not fully restarted in all locations, with WFP warning that this academic year's feeding is at risk. Learning conditions remain far from optimal as teachers work with limited resources. As of late February, UNICEF had estimated that the education sector response stood at only 57 percent funded against the humanitarian response plan, well below WASH at 96 percent and Child Protection at 95 percent.

This report confirms that schools occupy a specific and irreplaceable role in the protection networks of Jamaica's most vulnerable communities, offering physical safety, psychosocial stability, and access to trusted adults. When Melissa closed schools and displaced communities, it did not merely interrupt education. It removed one of the most important protective factors available to vulnerable children and their families. The dimensions of child protection and VAWG represent a large gap. Against an estimated 280,000 impacted school-aged young people, partner and government psychosocial support services have been vastly inadequate. Traumatized and behind the learning curve, many more students are now at risk of absenteeism or abandoning school and becoming potential members of a "lost generation" and a causal feeder into the violence pipeline that the education system exists, in part, to interrupt.

The recommendations in this report are organised by audience (government, donors, and civil society) and calibrated to those assets, with attention to both the immediate humanitarian gaps that must be closed before this academic year is lost, and the medium- and longer-term systems, protocols, and reforms that will determine how Jamaica's education sector weather future shocks. Based on the evidence presented in this report, five collective actions stand out as most urgent for government, donors, and partners in the coming months:

1. **Restart and stabilise the national school feeding programme.** WFP has confirmed this academic year's feeding is at risk without immediate emergency funding. No single action would do more to sustain attendance and re-enrolment among the students most at risk of permanent dropout.
2. **Locate and re-enrol unaccounted students.** The "yard-to-yard" search initiative underway is a strong start, but requires sustained community outreach, education management information system (EMIS) improvements, and documented results tracking. Continued absence narrows the window for intervention and increases the risk of permanent dropout.
3. **Unlock education recovery financing.** The financing picture for education recovery remains uncertain and slower than the scale of need demands. With the DaLA now public and multilateral financing mechanisms available but not yet activated for education, donors and partners should actively advocate for education to be treated as a priority and for financing decisions to move at the pace the recovery requires.
4. **Close the psychosocial support (PSS) gap.** The combined GOJ and partner response has reached only a small fraction with PSS services to date, and significant gaps remain. Donors and partners should treat PSS funding as an educational continuity priority on par with infrastructure, coordinating through existing platforms to maximise reach.
5. **Codify an education-specific disaster preparedness protocol.** The next hurricane season begins in two months; building on institutional lessons from the past several years, the GOJ should ensure that the education "playbook" development process is ready to go, covering shelter transition timelines, contingent budgets, and how decisions cascade from ministry to school before the next storm arrives.

A successful 12-month recovery trajectory would see Jamaica's most affected students back in school under conditions conducive to learning, along with feeding programmes restored to baseline

(and in some cases improved) levels, unaccounted students located and assisted to become re-enrolled or receive alternative learning services, and psychosocial support reaching those who need it most, including teachers. It would mean examination cohorts completing their adjusted sittings this May and June (with extensions where needed) with maximum participation and adequate preparation, and the 2026/27 school year opening in September 2026 with the 200 Priority 1 (severe damage likely affecting reopening)-designated schools rebuilt. It would mean a newly strengthened education preparedness protocol in place, financing decisions moving at the pace the recovery requires, and NGO and local groups prepared for scaled action when called upon. These goals will be challenging to reach across the board, but the findings in this report suggest that the conditions for that recovery are present, from institutional capacity to civil society reach and donor engagement.

1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Purpose and Scope of This Assessment

This rapid situational analysis completed by the Education Research in Conflict and Protracted Crisis (ERICC) Helpdesk mechanism provides a timely overview of Hurricane Melissa's impact on Jamaica's education sector. It focuses on the affected western parishes comprising education regions 3, 4, and 5, with particular attention to infrastructure damage, learning continuity, child protection and VAWG risks, psychosocial support, and coordination and financing structures.

The assessment serves as a companion analysis to the ERICC-produced paper "Rapid Assessment of Financial Preparedness in Education in Emergencies" (Shako, 2026), and it attends to the gender and child-protection dimensions of the response.

A formal Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) for the education sector is being conducted by UNESCO at MoESYI's request, using rigorous methodology and intended to produce a comprehensive, nationally owned dataset and recovery plan. This rapid situational analysis is not intended to substitute for that process. Rather, it is designed to provide an interim and actionable analysis ahead of the PDNA's completion, drawing on key informant interviews, desk review, and regional education officer data gathered in February and March 2026.

1.2 Jamaica's Basic Education System Before Hurricane Melissa

The Jamaica Education Transformation Commission's 2022 report characterised the country's basic education system as effectively two separate systems: one world-class and serving a privileged minority, the other serving the majority and largely failing, with the male disengagement crisis directly linked to the pipeline into gangs and violence (JETC, 2022). That diagnosis remains an accurate description of what the storm landed on.

The public education system spans five levels: early childhood, primary, secondary, special education, and tertiary/vocational, enrolling roughly 550,000 students across all levels, including tertiary, in more than 1,000 public schools and institutions (CAPRI/IAD, 2025). For reference, a short overview of the Pre-K through Grade 12 system in Jamaica is provided in Annex C. Governance sits with MoESYI, the National Council on Education, school boards, and the National Education Inspectorate, among other administrative bodies. The Inter-American Dialogue and CAPRI's 2025 Jamaica Education Report Card and the JETC's 2022 assessment, known as the Patterson Report, together offer a comprehensive pre-Melissa baseline and inform this summary.

Overall access to education has broadly improved, though persistent gaps sit beneath aggregate enrolment figures. Early childhood enrolment has grown; the pre-primary enrolment rate stands at approximately 62 percent for ages 4 to 6, though earlier estimates placed it considerably higher; and the quality of that provision is uneven regardless of the precise figure. Most early childhood institutions are privately operated and inadequately resourced (PIOJ, 2024; JETC, 2022). At the primary level, a net enrolment rate of 79 percent is below countries at Jamaica's level of development, with over 17 percent of primary-age children out of school due mainly to economic factors (JETC, 2022). Gross secondary enrolment stands at 115.6 percent, reflecting the presence of over-age learners, yet roughly one in five children remains out of school at the upper secondary level (CAPRI/IAD, 2025). Completion rates compound these access concerns: only eight in ten primary students receive a completion certificate, lower secondary completion has been declining, and

absenteeism continues to drive dropout, particularly among adolescent boys and poorer students (CAPRI/IAD, 2025).

Learning outcomes across levels are equally concerning. At the primary level, language arts declined in the years before Melissa, and the Primary Exit Profile exam, which tests analytic thinking rather than memorised learning, revealed that a third of students at the end of primary school could not read, 56 percent could not write, and 59 percent did not pass in mathematics (JETC, 2022). At the secondary level, only 1 in 5 students have the CSEC passage rates required for tertiary entry, while mathematics and science pass rates remain below 50 percent. Jamaica scored below global averages in all three PISA domains in 2022, with rural students performing far below urban counterparts (CAPRI/IAD, 2025), a disparity that maps onto the geography of Melissa's most severe damage. Most of these learning declines were accelerated by COVID-19 disruptions, from which the system had not fully recovered when the hurricane hit.

Certain demographics have been hardest hit by shocks to the education system. Boys and young men disengage from secondary school from third form onward at disproportionate rates, a trajectory with documented links to gang involvement and violence. Gender parity at the tertiary level has shifted sharply in women's favour; women account for 69 percent of university enrolment and graduate at roughly three times the rate of men. Students with disabilities are underserved, with no systematic tracking mechanism and limited specialist support across the system, even at the schools designated for special education (Pious, 2026; CAPRI/IAD, 2025).

Finally, it bears emphasising that the teacher workforce in Jamaica has also been under strain. Half of all teacher training institutions lack full accreditation, meaning many teachers enter classrooms without preparation meeting national standards (CAPRI/IAD, 2025). The classroom-level consequences are larger class sizes and reduced capacity for the individualised instruction that struggling students most need. Comparatively low teaching salaries for the region (despite high education spending as a share of GDP), have driven steady attrition and emigration, and a three-year salary freeze between 2022 and 2025 deepened an at-times tense relationship between Jamaica Teachers Association (JTA) and the state.

The JETC's 2022 report had delivered a clear-eyed diagnosis of these structural weaknesses: slow reform, administrative fragility, and a learning crisis concentrated among boys and rural students (JETC, 2022). The education line ministry (now the Ministry of Education, Skills Youth, and Information) had been undergoing a long-standing organisational restructuring in partial response to that diagnosis, but the process remained incomplete when Melissa arrived, hampering the ministry's capacity for coordinated disaster response.

1.3 Hurricane Melissa: Scale and Immediate Impact

Hurricane Melissa made landfall on 28 October 2025, tracking directly across the western parishes as a Category 5 storm with winds of 185 miles per hour. A reported 45 people perished. Estimated damages are reported at some USD 12.2 billion, representing more than 50 percent of GDP, and making Hurricane Melissa the most economically devastating natural disaster in Jamaica's recorded history. The private sector bore almost 80 percent of total losses, with profound implications for household economic capacity and for families' ability to sustain children's schooling (PIOJ/UNECLAC, 2026).

Beyond the physical destruction, the storm displaced thousands of families across the western parishes, severed community ties, and delivered a profound economic and psychological shock to communities already stretched by years of compounding hardship.

The geographic concentration of damage is captured in the World Bank's Global Rapid Post-Disaster Damage Estimation (GRADE) assessment, which used geospatial remote-sensing methods to produce parish-level estimates. St. Elizabeth suffered the highest losses at USD 2.3 billion; St. James USD 1.8 billion; and Westmoreland USD 1.4 billion. Together, the five most-affected western and central parishes account for approximately 90 percent of total estimated damage (GRADE, 2025). Non-residential buildings, a category that includes schools and health facilities, accounted for around 20 percent of total damage at USD 1.77 billion. The education sector was among the hardest hit and is overviewed in Section 3 of this report.

2. METHODOLOGY

This report draws on approximately 30 key informant interviews across all major stakeholder groups, complemented by more than 30 primary and secondary documentary sources. It employed a rapid qualitative methodology combining desk review of government and development partner reports, academic literature, and targeted interviews conducted with key stakeholders from government agencies, international organisations, civil society groups, and school leaders in Jamaica. Interviews were conducted between 27 February and 18 March 2026. It was designed as a situational analysis, or a timely synthesis of available evidence intended to inform programming decisions, rather than a comprehensive research study. It is focused on the basic education system (understood as pre-K through Grade 12), given that the post-secondary and tertiary education system represents both a distinct and comparatively privileged demographic whose recovery process has been and will be somewhat different (albeit with unique and important challenges of its own).

Key informant interviews were conducted in and around Kingston, including by remote video and phone, with interlocutors representing government, civil society, NGOs, academia, international partners, and community and school leaders directly affected by the storm. A snowball sampling approach was employed given the relatively small and interconnected nature of the relevant actor community. A full list of respondents is provided in Annex A.

The desk review encompassed more than 30 primary and secondary sources, including damage assessments, ministerial statements, UN situation reports, peer-reviewed literature, and grey literature from government, donors, and civil society. Media sources including the Jamaica Observer and Jamaica Gleaner were drawn on for specific data points on absenteeism, student tracking, and community conditions. A full list of documents reviewed is provided in Annex B.

Editing and formatting of some sections of this report were assisted by Claude, an AI tool developed by Anthropic; all fieldwork, interviews, analysis, and editorial judgments reflect the author's own assessment.

Limitations: Field perspectives skew toward Kingston-based national and international actors; the direct voices of teachers, parents, and students in the most affected communities are limited in the primary record and represent a known gap. Availability of official data was dynamic and uneven across the impacted regions; gaps or estimates are noted where relevant throughout the report. Findings are analytically grounded but should be read as provisional given the pace of an evolving recovery and the inherent constraints of a rapid methodology.

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
3. SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS

3.1 Infrastructure and Access

The physical destruction wrought by Hurricane Melissa on Jamaica's school infrastructure was extensive, geographically concentrated, and in many cases compounded by structural vulnerabilities that pre-existed the storm. In the most affected parishes, damage ranged from blown roofing and shattered windows to complete structural and infrastructural failure. The pattern is not simply one of natural disaster overwhelming adequate buildings; respondents noted that schools refurbished as recently as early 2025 suffered new damage from Melissa, raising immediate questions about construction standards and the adequacy of pre-existing building codes in a country increasingly exposed to Category 4 and 5 storms (Caribbean Safe Schools Meta-Analysis, 2025; Foster Allen, 2026). As available data for this report was limited or evolving, findings should be interpreted as indicative.

Figure 1 illustrates the geographic concentration of hurricane damage across the three education regions encompassing the seven most affected parishes, which together account for the overwhelming majority of school damage, learning disruption, and unaccounted students documented in this report.

Figure 1: Hurricane-affected education regions/parishes



Map: elaborated by Michael Lisman

According to MoESYI, 679 public schools and 21 tertiary institutions were impacted across Westmoreland, Hanover, St. James, Trelawny, St. Ann, St. Elizabeth, and Manchester (encompassing MoESYI regions 3, 4, and 5). Of these, 239 were classified as Priority 1 (severe damage likely affecting reopening), 339 as Priority 2 (significant repairs needed but operable), and 101 as Priority 3 (minor damage, operable). A subsequent MoESYI account puts the number of severely impacted schools at 447, a figure that likely reflects a refined assessment as damage evaluation progressed and corresponds approximately to the combined Priority 1 and Priority 2 classifications (MoESYI, November 2025; MoESYI, February 2026). Annex D provides an illustrative parish-level summary of impact based on estimates and reports from regional education officers.

School repairs were underway in approximately 200 public infant, primary, and secondary schools, with additional schools targeted for coming weeks; by the start of February 2026, work was actively underway at 56 Priority 1 schools, with contractors identified to begin work at 98 other P-1 schools (MoESYI, January 2026).

The UNICEF-provided classroom tents and tarps, which have been deployed across St. Elizabeth, St. Ann, Trelawny, St. James, Hanover, and Westmoreland, collectively create classroom spaces for more than 53,000 students (UNICEF SitRep #7, 2026). These are logistical achievements, but they also illuminate the scale of what remains unresolved: tens of thousands of children learning in fabric structures and beneath makeshift roofing, months after a hurricane, because the permanent infrastructure has not been restored. Regional Education Officers in the field have flagged the limitations of tents as a long-term solution, noting that ongoing rains continue to damage deployed structures and disrupt the learning environments they are meant to protect. Container classrooms have been proposed as a more durable alternative, offering weatherproof, semi-permanent learning spaces that could bridge the gap between tent-based emergency provisions and full infrastructure restoration (Nelson Smith, 2026).

MoESYI and partners have also distributed 150 Starlink satellite connectivity devices and are installing 15 Hispasat devices across affected schools. This is a concrete, anticipatory action on digital infrastructure that, if sustained, could meaningfully reduce the connectivity gap identified as a barrier to learning continuity. Whether these devices remain operational and maintained beyond the emergency phase is a question that will define their long-term value. Respondents also indicated concerns about cost to users, even where subsidised, which could prove prohibitive. Locally anchored solutions, including partnerships with domestic providers (i.e., Digicel), may offer more sustainable long-term connectivity than emergency satellite deployments, though this remains an unresolved planning question ahead of the next hurricane season (Campbell Miller, 2026).

The persistence of some schools as emergency shelters for displaced persons is among the most concerning findings of this assessment. As of early March, reporting suggests that nine schools in Hanover and Westmoreland were still serving as shelters for 100 displaced people. This is down from 15 schools and 161 people in early January, but still ongoing more than three months later (UNICEF SitRep #7, #6, 2026). UNICEF confirmed that Westmoreland sheltering was still ongoing as of early March 2026, making it the only parish where school-as-shelter use has persisted into the fourth month post-Melissa (Tortello, 2026). This situation reflects a gap in pre-existing protocols for managing the transition of shelter occupants to alternative accommodation and protecting learning environments from indefinite occupation, which is a challenge that no Caribbean country has fully resolved.

The Caribbean Safe Schools Meta-Analysis (2025) identified the use of schools as shelters as a regional pattern that creates protection risks, including risks of sexual exploitation and abuse that are insufficiently addressed in existing guidance across Caribbean countries. Ministry Director of Safety, Richard Troupe, confirmed that the management of school-as-shelter transitions is governed not by MoESYI solely but by ODPEM, which determines when shelters close based on the ability of displaced persons to return home, which is a structural coordination gap that leaves MoESYI without full authority over its own buildings for the duration of shelter use (Troupe, 2026).

Early childhood institutions (ECIs) merit special attention here, as a majority of them are not publicly managed, and this report did not obtain reliable measures of the damage to the privately-run ECIs. Updated figures indicate 483 public ECIs had minor to severe damage in the most affected parishes with a further 180 damaged in other parishes, for a total of 663 facilities affecting some 24,000 children

aged two to six island-wide (UNICEF SitRep #7, 2026). Incidentally, the CHASE Fund, which builds and rehabilitates public early childhood infrastructure using its own contractors and weather-resistant construction standards, reported that all 13 of the infant schools it had built in the most impacted parishes survived Melissa with only minor damage, even as public primary schools adjacent to them were destroyed (Foster, 2026).

Private, religious, and community ECIs (or “infant schools”) account for nearly 75 percent of pre-primary enrolment. A separate assessment of non-public institutions found an additional 335 privately operated ECIs and independent schools affected (distinct from the 663 public facilities noted above), of which 122 were severely damaged, 115 moderately damaged, and 81 sustained mild damage (MoESYI, February 2026). Unlike public schools, they did not receive initial or direct government reconstruction support; the responsibility for rebuilding falls on operators, churches, and communities already stretched thin by the disaster, and their ability to access private insurance plans remains unclear (JISA, 2026).

The wider private independent school sector (K-12) has been reportedly underserved by the reconstruction response. The Jamaica Independent Schools Association (JISA) reported that 53 member schools were affected across the most affected parishes, while the ministry reported a total of 126 non-public schools as damaged (MoESYI, November 2025). Respondents indicated that in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, independent schools were almost entirely excluded from government reconstruction support, and received no contractor assignments, no priority designation, nor access to the Rapid Resumption Grant available to public schools. Classrooms were equally destroyed, electrical systems replaced, water tanks lost, and in some cases, schools were looted by community members taking materials for home repairs in the chaos following the storm. These may have been largely isolated incidents, but ones that compounded the damage to an already excluded sector (Troupe, 2026; McKenzie/JISA, 2026).

Some JISA schools reported ultimately receiving assistance in early 2026, and across the affected regions, private and independent schools appear to have received more engagement from MoESYI's central independent school unit in the recovery phase than in the immediate aftermath, including damage assessments in some parishes, which can assist those that carry private insurance. However, the nature and scale of actual reconstruction support received by these institutions remains uneven (Nelson Smith, 2026; McKenzie/JISA, 2026). JISA reports that they are actively compiling damage data through the ministry registrar; that data, once available, will substantially sharpen the picture of independent recovery school need (McKenzie/JISA, 2026).

On the security environment in schools post-Melissa, there has actually been a noted decrease in violence and homicides in the affected areas in the months following the hurricane, perhaps indicating a degree of community solidarity and goodwill in the aftermath of a shared catastrophe (Troupe, 2026). Reports of looting of schools did occur in some communities, where residents removed materials from damaged buildings to help rebuild their own homes, but it appears that these were largely isolated incidents rather than organised or opportunistic criminality. The more troublesome protection risk, in Troupe's assessment, was the structural one: the indefinite occupation of schools as shelters disrupting educational environments, and the continued displacement of vulnerable students, particularly young women and elderly persons in shared shelter spaces, whose risks require monitoring even in the absence of reported incidents (Troupe, 2026).

Road infrastructure damage has compounded the access barriers across the overall response. In parts of Trelawny, for example, roads remained damaged or impassable for several weeks after the storm, limiting both student and teacher movement and restricting the delivery of materials and

services to affected schools. The National Works Agency began JMD 328 million in road repairs in western Jamaica, but as of February 2026 access barriers continued to affect school attendance in some communities (Jamaica Observer, 2026). In Westmoreland, a coordinated “twinning modality” (hosting displaced western students and teachers at eastern schools on a short-term basis) provided a partial solution to the access problem, but its long-term sustainability and impact on the receiving schools’ own learning environments have not been formally assessed (Tortello, 2026). As of March 2026, reports and respondents across the western parishes suggest access has improved through the combined efforts of government, the business community, and national agencies, though ongoing seasonal rains continue to affect daily operations and school attendance in some communities.

3.2 Educational Continuity

Four months on, reported attendance remains below pre-Melissa levels across all three affected regions, but particularly at the secondary levels. By February 2026, overall reported absenteeism stood at 28 percent in Region 4 (encompassing St. James, Hanover, and Westmoreland), a figure subsequently corroborated by Minister of Education Dana Morris Dixon in a March 2026 parliamentary statement confirming Region 4 attendance at 66 percent (MoESYI, March 2026). Region 3 (St. Ann and Trelawny) showed some parish-level variation: St. Ann reported 15 percent absenteeism while Trelawny, more severely affected, recorded 24 percent. Region 5 (St. Elizabeth and Manchester) reported an overall attendance rate of 81 percent, with secondary level attendance at 65 percent, the most concerning subgroup for which data is available (MoESYI, February 2026; Campbell Miller, 2026; Nelson Smith, 2026).

Beyond absenteeism, more than 1,000 students in Region 4 remain entirely unaccounted for: not registered at their original school, not recorded as transferred, and not confirmed as having left the system voluntarily (MoESYI, February 2026). In Region 5, an additional 560 students are unaccounted for: 483 at the secondary level and 77 at the primary level (MoESYI, February 2026; Foster Allen, 2026; Nelson Smith, 2026). Ground-level reporting from Westmoreland corroborates the scale of the problem: community leaders in Savanna-la-Mar independently estimated that nearly half of upper-form students in the parish had not returned to school, consistent with the 50 percent figure reported by the Regional Education Officer, and citing finances, lack of electricity, and lack of water as the primary barriers (Jamaica Gleaner, 2026). Region 3 did not report significant accounted-for numbers (Campbell Miller). Overall, these snapshot numbers likely understate the true extent of dropout and disengagement post-hurricane, as student tracking systems remain patchy and the ability to follow individuals across parish boundaries is limited (King, 2026; Foster Allen, 2026).

The causes of increased non-attendance at this stage are numerous and intersectional. Displacement from homes has separated families from their communities and from their children’s original schools. Damaged or destroyed textbooks, uniforms, and school material have created financial barriers to return that many households, already economically devastated by the hurricane, cannot easily overcome (Clarke Callum, 2026). Economic hardship is also understandably pushing some students, particularly older adolescents, into early employment in recovery and rebuilding efforts. Older male students in Region 4 had already had low attendance pre-Melissa, and are now working in construction, earning money that their families depend upon. The Government-led “yard-to-yard” initiative, which deploys community volunteers to locate unaccounted students by visiting households, represents a key effort to address this problem, but its coverage and conversion rate is not yet documented. Worth noting is that returning to school under the current conditions may not even be advisable from a “rational economic actor” perspective; until the confluence of basic

conditions of school infrastructure, teaching and learning processes, school meals, and remedial and PSS services are made available and relevant, it will be difficult to attract and keep those students, particularly adolescents, in normal schooling.

For the majority of students who are back to attending school now, the quality of instruction has been substantially compromised, at least in the short term. Rotational and blended learning modalities, while pragmatic given space constraints, reduce instructional time for all students. Teachers are simultaneously managing their own displacement and trauma, supporting students in acute distress, and trying to maintain instructional continuity with depleted resources, which is, in turn, producing widespread teacher fatigue (Foster Allen, 2026). To extend learning beyond the physical classroom, MoESYI activated a range of remote modalities including synchronous online learning, asynchronous digital resources, offline printed kits, and broadcast lessons via radio and television, with the modality chosen depending on available connectivity and infrastructure (MoESYI, November 2025).

Teachers in the western parishes rallied in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane with the resilience and resourcefulness that has historically characterised the teaching profession. Four months of teaching in damaged buildings, with traumatised students, and without adequate support, is producing an understandable strain. Moreover, MoESYI has noted a pattern of increased teacher resignations across the affected regions, with some teachers accepting positions overseas. This is a trend that predated Hurricane Melissa but has accelerated in its aftermath, likely driven by the pressures of personal struggles, inadequate support, and sustained work under emergency conditions (Campbell Miller, 2026; Nelson Smith, 2026), suggesting that local cooperation between teachers, students, and families will be the most important determinant of keeping key learning and grade progression targets on track.

However, because of the economic and social risks of a “lost school year” for some, the examination cohorts have received prioritised attention in the government’s response. Daily instruction for PEP, CSEC, and CAPE students was maintained where possible, and examinations were rescheduled to February 2026 with a further option in June 2026. More recently, CXC announced that high schools in the seven most affected parishes would have the option to adopt a modified approach for the May/June 2026 examinations under its Regional Disaster and Business Recovery Protocol, with candidates unable to sit their exams given the option to defer to 2027 or seek a refund (CXC, 2026). Additionally, the Grade Two Diagnostic Test and the Grade Nine Achievement Tests (GNAT) were suspended for the 2025/26 academic year, and the PEP was modified to de-emphasise non-essential areas and prioritise core competencies, reducing the assessment burden on students and teachers still operating under emergency conditions (MoESYI, February 2026).

To be sure, systematic learning loss assessments have not yet been conducted across the affected region, though plans are underway. For the time being, this leaves the medium- and long-term academic consequences largely unquantified.

The National School Feeding Programme, a powerful tool for sustaining attendance and nutritional status among lower-income students (and households), had not fully restarted as of the time of this writing. WFP’s assessment confirmed that school kitchens were being rebuilt and coordination with UNICEF on WASH, and kitchen infrastructure was underway, but no clear timeline for programme restart has been confirmed (WFP, 2026). The PATH cash transfer component linked to school attendance provides only USD 1 per student per day, inadequate even before Melissa, and the supply chains and school farms that underpin it were largely wiped out by the storm (Thwaites, 2026; WFP, 2026). WFP’s own analysis is that this school year’s feeding programme is at risk without additional emergency funding, and the deadline for securing that funding is now (WFP, 2026). Given the strength

of the evidence linking school feeding to attendance and re-enrolment in contexts of economic hardship, the delay is worrisome.

The school feeding picture is dynamic and varies by parish and school levels. Across Region 5, a patchwork of support from WFP, UNICEF, ODPEM, and private donors has kept feeding programmes running in many schools, with school gardens beginning to restart and some communities receiving food support that extends beyond students to their families. This regional variation suggests that where school feeding is being sustained, it has in large part depended on the initiative of local partners and available resources (Nelson Smith, 2026).

Some alternatives to attracting students back to schools have been considered, as well. While the “e-learning” initiatives attempted during COVID received mixed reviews at best, materials and connectivity may not even be available under current circumstances. The BRIDGE initiative (Building Resilience and Inspiring Development through Guided Experience), announced in February 2026, addressed a dynamic that multiple interviewees described: older male students and young men making economically rational decisions to work in construction rather than return to school. BRIDGE will engage 200 unemployed youth aged 18 to 25 from St. Elizabeth, Westmoreland, St. James, and Hanover in supervised on-site construction work, with a monthly stipend of JMD 65,000 (MoESYI, February 2026).

Some recent academic literature provides a frame for understanding what Melissa’s disruption is likely to mean for the longer-term learning outcomes of students. Spencer, Polachek, and Strobl (2016), in a study of hurricane impacts on Caribbean scholastic achievement, found negative effects on long-term academic performance for storms of comparable severity; Melissa struck mid-Term 1, or seven weeks into the academic year, at a moment when this year’s curriculum foundation had barely been laid. Research on Puerto Rico following Hurricane María found that dropout risk was a nearly 20 percent higher for eighth graders in severely affected areas, with more pronounced effects among males and those with the longest school interruptions (Segarra-Alméstica et al., 2022). Caruso et al. (2025), in a study of 5.4 million individuals across 13 LMICs, found that exposure to tropical cyclones during preschool age was associated with an increased likelihood of never attending school at later ages, a particularly alarming finding given the scale of ECI damage and the thousands of children whose early learning has been disrupted. Moreover, Jamaica-specific evidence from Category 4 Hurricane Ivan in 2004 found that while overall school enrolment was largely unaffected, attendance by girls in rural areas declined, driven by disruptions to school services (Raeburn, 2023).

3.3 Child Protection, VAWG, and Psychosocial Support

Initial framing of the government’s education response was entirely infrastructural, logistical, and humanitarian. The World Bank-led Global Rapid Post-Disaster Damage Estimation (GRADE), however, explicitly identifies intensified gender and social inequalities, including increased risks of gender-based violence, as a predictable consequence of the disaster (GRADE, 2025).

Jamaica’s pre-disaster baseline on violence against women and children was already concerning. The Violence Against Children Survey (VACS) found lifetime physical violence experienced by over half of females, and three in five males (VACS, 2023). The JETC report noted that the country’s gender crisis in education, in which boys rather than girls are the disadvantaged group, is directly linked to unusually high rates of sexual violence against women and girls, including what the commission described as among the highest femicide rates globally (JETC, 2022). A 2025 analysis of women in crime describes how women in gang-affected informal communities navigate between legal and illicit economies under conditions of irregular land tenure, weak governance, and economic

dependency, and these are dynamics that characterise many of the communities into which Hurricane Melissa landed (CAPRI, 2025). Existing research confirms that extreme weather events are consistently associated with increases in emotional, physical, and sexual GBV, with violence rates rising particularly when women are displaced (Van Daalen et al., 2022).

Eve for Life, operating with UNICEF support across seven parishes in the aftermath of the hurricane, documented exactly the patterns the research would predict: women returning to abusive partners out of economic desperation, adolescent girls exchanging sex for basic necessities in tourist belt communities, and in some cases the movement of younger females for sex work between communities as a direct consequence of displacement, a form of internal trafficking that standard reporting mechanisms are not designed to capture (Crawford, 2026). Displacement itself is a risk amplifier, as women and girls separated from their families and known social networks lose the informal protection those networks provide. Unmet basic needs compound these risks further. The government's de facto breastfeeding-only policy, for example, creates a documented gap in formula provision for newborns whose mothers cannot breastfeed, with direct implications for infant malnutrition in displaced households (Crawford, 2026). Additionally, LGBTQ individuals and people with disabilities face a compounded trust deficit that makes formal reporting and service access functionally unavailable to them, regardless of what protocols exist on paper (Crawford, 2026).

Multiple respondents for this report made clear that schools occupy a specific and irreplaceable role in the protection systems of vulnerable communities. They are among the few institutions capable of offering physical safety, psychosocial stability, and access to trusted adults, particularly for girls. School also functions as a day-care and safe space: girls not in school are at home without protection, and school is where children are sometimes able to disclose abuse to guidance counsellors and teachers (Crawford, 2026). Children First Agency documented cases of abuse, child labour, grooming for prostitution, and neglect and abandonment in the aftermath of Hurricane Melissa (Pious, 2026).

The observation that the 1,000 or more unaccounted students in Region 4 represent a portion of a potential lost generation feeding into the violence pipeline is not rhetorical: it describes a well-documented mechanism by which education disruption converts into community violence over a period of years (Foster Allen, 2026; Troupe, 2026).

Within the constraints of available resources, UNICEF and its partners have mounted a laudable child protection response. Since late October 2025, UNICEF, IsraAID, and the IFRC/Jamaica Red Cross, among others, served over 4,000 children and caregivers across eight parishes with psychosocial support, over half of whom are girls. Some children identified as requiring intensive individual care were referred to specialised state services, though the capacity for such intensive services remains unclear (UNICEF SitRep #7, 2026). A national government-led Child Protection Working Group was formally launched earlier in the year, with a mapping tool and real-time dashboard developed to enhance the visibility and tracking of interventions (Tortello, 2026). These are meaningful steps, but the reach figures must be held against the scale of the need. The Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) response must also continue to be assessed carefully. UNICEF has provided coaching to implementing partners' PSEA Focal Points, developed contextualised communication materials, and maintained active participation in the inter-agency PSEA Network and GBV sub-cluster (UNICEF SitRep #7, 2026). The Ministry of Education's own Safety and Security Policy Guidelines contain a full section on trafficking, including domestic legislation and the Ananda Alert system. The question

raised by several respondents, however, is whether these mechanisms are functioning in communities where telecommunications infrastructure was damaged by the storm (Troupe, 2026).

The psychosocial support needs generated by Hurricane Melissa are substantial and, on current evidence, dramatically underserved. Close to 800 early childhood practitioners have been trained in play-based psychosocial first aid, and PFA training is underway for over 1,000 teachers, counsellors, and volunteers at the infant, primary, and secondary levels (MoESYI, 2026). UNICEF estimates these activities will ultimately benefit some 20,000 students, which is a fraction of those affected (UNICEF SitRep #7, 2026). In the western parishes, the VPP's Wellness Express, funded by FCDO and deployed after Melissa, extends mobile mental health services into communities where static provision cannot reach; FCDO has confirmed that VPP has scaled up psychosocial interventions and is exploring ways to adapt to changing needs. In Region 5, a dedicated guidance and counsellor unit has provided psychological first aid, art therapy, and cluster-level support sessions for school principals, as well as targeted sessions for parents (Nelson Smith, 2026).

Finally, teachers occupy a paradoxical position in the PSS response: they are simultaneously among the primary providers of psychosocial support to traumatised students and among those most in need of support themselves. Four months of sustained effort in damaged schools, without adequate resources, support, or recognition, is now producing visible fatigue (Foster Allen, 2026). Richard Troupe recommends to engage social workers on short-term contracts at the 13 VPP schools in the west and pivot existing VPP activities toward PSS and re-engagement (Troupe, 2026). UNICEF has committed to training 600 teachers from the most affected schools in the Return to Happiness psychosocial methodology, with the Guidance and Counselling Unit training an additional 450 counsellors and volunteers to support at least 5,500 of the most affected students and families (UNICEF, 2026).

In sum, the hurricane response exposed gaps in knowledge and planning, specifically in the child protection and psychosocial dimensions. The true scale of GBV, exploitation, and child protection incidents in the affected communities may well be under-documented, and standard reporting mechanisms are not designed to capture what is happening in displacement conditions. There does not appear to be systematic data on the protection situation of LGBTQ individuals or people with disabilities, who face compounded barriers to reporting and service access. On the planning side, no clear or widely implemented protocol seems to exist for managing child protection risks in schools being used as emergency shelters, a gap the Caribbean Safe Schools Meta-Analysis identified as common across the region. Closing these gaps requires not just more funding, but better data systems and clearer accountability for protection outcomes in response efforts.

3.4 Coordination and Financing

Coordination

Jamaica's education recovery has a coordination infrastructure, but available evidence suggests the financing has not yet matched the scale of need. UNICEF co-leads the Education Technical Working Group with the MoESYI, which has convened regularly since the hurricane and includes UNESCO, the National Education Trust, JISA, and the Jamaica Network of Corporate Foundations; notably, the Jamaica Defence Force played a critical logistics role in the early weeks (Tortello, 2026). Parallel coordination platforms for WASH, Nutrition, Child Protection, and Cash Transfers operate under UNICEF co-leadership and the respective line ministries. How decisions escalate and are resolved at the cabinet and prime ministerial level was not fully clear from the evidence gathered for this assessment, and the relationship between education coordination structures and wider protection programming remains a noted gap.

Across interviews, a consistent pattern emerged: coordination structures have functioned reasonably well at the sector level but have been less effective at translating into coherent action on financing decisions, protection programming, and student tracking across agencies. From PIOJ's perspective, the single biggest risk to the education recovery that is not yet receiving sufficient attention is learning

loss and its long-term implications for human capital development—a regression that, if unaddressed, will outlast the physical reconstruction by years (Coy, 2026).

Financing

The Damage and Loss Assessment (DaLA) was completed, and its findings were publicly presented by PIOJ in early March, with total damage and losses confirmed at USD 12.2 billion (PIOJ, 2026; Jamaica Observer, 2026). Within that total, the education sector impact was recorded at approximately JMD 30 billion (roughly USD 193 million), though this figure likely understates the full extent of the sector's needs (PIOJ/UNECLAC, 2026). Nonetheless, as revised estimates enter the public domain, downstream financing decisions at the World Bank can proceed. The World Bank is able to activate the contingency embedded in its existing secondary education loan if the government makes that request (Levin, 2026), while the IDB has a USD 300 million emergency credit line activated for all sectors post-Melissa, though education has not yet been defined as a priority within it (Arias, 2026). Patricia Shako, a disaster risk financing specialist consulted for this assessment, notes that the release of sector-specific budget needs by the Ministry of Finance is a prerequisite for activating multilateral contingency mechanisms and for donor budget cycles to align with recovery priorities—a step that had not yet occurred at the time of writing, leaving the full financing picture unresolved (Shako, 2026). For private institutions, an insurance component has not yet been calculated, and the extent of government support to that sector remains undetermined but critical (Coy, 2026).

Limited information on financing was made available by the government for this report, but pending the PDNA and other comprehensive sector reviews expected later in 2026, the financing needs for education appear significant and urgent, and the relative underfunding of education recovery compared to other sectors in the humanitarian response thus far is a consistent finding across multiple sources (UNICEF SitRep #7, 2026; Tortello, 2026).


Beyond the humanitarian response plan, Jamaica's pre-arranged disaster risk financing framework activated quickly after Melissa, mobilising approximately USD 662 million through a combination of government contingency reserves, parametric insurance, a catastrophe bond, and contingent credit lines (Shako, 2026). Against total losses of USD 12.2 billion, these instruments covered a fraction of the damage, and the education sector has been among the least served by what was available (Shako, 2026). Reconstruction financing will depend heavily on bilateral donors and multilateral commitments that are still being negotiated. Debt consolidation remains a government priority, though the fiscal pressure generated by the scale of the recovery efforts may require recalibration of that trajectory (Coy, 2026).

On the domestic side, the National Education Trust (NET) is the principal government vehicle for channelling reconstruction financing to school infrastructure, with a mandate covering construction, maintenance, donor management, and diaspora engagement (direct engagement with NET was not possible within the timeline of this assessment). The CHASE Fund represents an additional domestic financing mechanism; CHASE allocated JMD 90 million post-Melissa, channelled through the NET toward public early childhood infrastructure. The Jamaica Social Investment Fund (JSIF) has also been active in supporting school reconstruction in the affected regions, providing an additional channel for infrastructure financing alongside NET and CHASE (Nelson Smith, 2026). The Jamaica Network of Corporate Foundations was activated in the aftermath of Melissa to coordinate corporate philanthropy across food and beverage, tourism, banking, insurance, telecommunications, and entertainment. The private sector's contribution has been noteworthy but somewhat uncoordinated at the individual foundation level, a pattern that could benefit from systematisation (NET, 2026; Tortello, 2026; McDonald R., 2026).

To situate education within the broader domestic response, the GOJ's total emergency hurricane spending of JMD 67 billion, announced by the Minister of Finance on 10 March, was allocated across multiple sectors. As illustrated in Figure 2, MoESYI received JMD 2.3 billion of that total, equivalent to approximately JMD 1 million per affected school across 616 institutions, which is one of the smaller sectoral allocations relative to the scale of damage sustained (about 3.4 percent of the JMD 67 billion in government emergency spending). While this understandably reflects the immediate prioritisation of electricity, water, and shelter restoration, it highlights the challenge of education financing as the recovery transitions from emergency relief to recovery (JIS, 10 March 2026).

Figure 2: GOJ Emergency Hurricane Melissa Spending by Sector

Education received JMD 2.3 billion of the JMD 67 billion in government emergency spending



Source: Minister of Finance Fayval Williams, 2026/27 Budget Debate, 10 March 2026, via Jamaica Information Service. Figures in JMD billions.

Looking forward, the Government's 2026/27 Estimates of Expenditure include a JMD 18 billion allocation for disaster preparedness, mitigation, and response in schools, a substantial increase over prior cycles and a signal that the government intends to treat school resilience as a sustained budget priority rather than a one-time recovery expense (Jamaica Gleaner, 2026). At the school and household level, reported delays in the restart of PATH conditional cash transfers have compounded the financial pressure on the most vulnerable families, with students not yet re-registered in the programme losing critical support that links attendance to household income (Nelson Smith, 2026). This is particularly concerning given that PATH uptake among eligible households was already declining before the storm, with the share of the poorest households not applying rising from 29 percent in 2019 to 34 percent in 2021, suggesting that the programme was not reaching all of those who needed it even under normal conditions (CAPRI/IAD, 2025).

The National Reconstruction and Resilience Authority (NARA) is being stood up concurrently with the recovery process, and its mandate relative to existing agencies like NET is still being worked through. From PIOJ's perspective, the approach has been described as "all hands on deck," but the practical application of NARA's mandate to school infrastructure remains undefined at the time of writing (Coy,

2026). Accountability for education sector recovery sits formally with MoESYI, with NET operating under ministry coordination and PIOJ serving as an interlocutor with international development partners rather than a decision-making body in its own right.

The risks of underfunding of education in Jamaica's recovery reflects not only the exceptional scale of Melissa's destruction, but a structural pattern in which education has been systematically under-integrated into disaster risk financing planning. The Shako analysis proposes a layered financing model structured around three tiers as a framework for closing that gap: sovereign parametric instruments for large shocks, contingent credit for medium-level events, and community-based funds for high-frequency disruptions. A detailed treatment of Jamaica's available DRF instruments is provided in that analysis (Shako, 2026).

3.5 What Held: Stability, Resilience, and Foundations to Build From

Along with the documenting of damages and remaining challenges, it is worth stating clearly what the Government of Jamaica achieved: by 14 January 2026, just eleven weeks after the storm, all public schools had returned to some form of operation. In a country where the storm damaged or disrupted nearly half the school system, that turnaround reflects resilient institutional capacity and deserves to be recognised as a heroic achievement. Educator commitment and resilience was the single most consistent finding across every interview conducted for this assessment. In the western parishes, teachers showed up. They improvised and ran classes in tents, beneath tarps, or in damaged buildings without running water or electricity for uncertain stretches of time. It is a documented pattern repeated after COVID, after Beryl, and now after Melissa (Foster Allen, 2026). Regional Education Officers interviewed for this report described MoESYI's support as consistent and responsive throughout the recovery period, with the ministry providing both logistical and moral support to regional teams from the earliest days of the response (Nelson Smith & Campbell Miller, 2026).

The Jamaican church school network activated immediately and effectively. An estimated half of primary schools are church-affiliated or assisted, and the denominations (Anglican, Church of God of Prophecy, Seventh Day Adventist, and others) provided community leadership, physical space, and organisational coherence that enabled civil society organisations to reach communities that formal government and UN systems could not access as quickly (Pious, 2026; Thwaites, 2026).

Civil society organisations demonstrated the capacity to scale rapidly under emergency conditions when contingency funding was made available. Eve for Life was in seven parishes within weeks of the hurricane. JYAN activated a 300-person volunteer network for fundraising and solidarity support. None of these are large organisations. Their reach relative to their resource base is evidence of deep community roots and programmatic capability, which is exactly the civil society layer that international partners consistently identify as missing in fragile contexts, and that Jamaica demonstrably has (Pious, 2026; Crawford, 2026; Bowden, 2026).

The private sector and philanthropic coordination are also noteworthy. The Jamaica Network of Corporate Foundations, including notable leadership from the Sandals Foundation, GraceKennedy Foundation, Sagicor, and others, activated to connect corporate philanthropy with humanitarian response needs, enabling the government and partners to tap business support rapidly. The National Education Trust (NET), with its established donor management and project management infrastructure, provided a credible government-side counterpart for channelling reconstruction financing at the school level. That this infrastructure existed and functioned is not trivial: many

countries of comparable size and income do not have it or are unable to rely upon it under extreme conditions (Tortello, 2026; McDonald R., 2026).

Geographically, the eastern parishes (Kingston, St. Andrew, St. Thomas, Portland, and St. Mary) were substantially less affected by Melissa's physical damage. Numerous respondents counted the sparing of these areas (home to the economic and government hubs of the island) as the single most important aspect of the storm's recovery process. Moreover, public schools in these parishes broadly maintained normalised operations throughout the response period, and they served an additional function: hosting displaced western students and teachers through UNICEF's twinning modality, absorbing some of the human displacement that physical infrastructure alone could not accommodate. The comparative stability of the east also meant that the national examinations infrastructure, including the Caribbean Examinations Council's regional processing and the Ministry's national assessment administration continued to function, enabling the rescheduled PEP, CSEC, and CAPE sittings to proceed. These are not achievements to be taken for granted under the circumstances.

Also worth noting is that the government's pre-landfall response was substantial. Beginning 22 October, the government issued seven consecutive days of press briefings, activated hundreds of designated shelters with pre-positioned supplies, issued mandatory evacuation orders for high-risk communities, and engaged food, fuel, and transport sectors to safeguard supply chains (MoESYI, November 2025). This, combined with the UN system's pre-positioning of emergency supplies drawing on prior preparedness lessons, reflects a measure of institutional learning and a functional preparedness protocol. The activation of the contingency grants and the establishment of the Education Technical Working Group each represent a humanitarian coordination infrastructure that, whatever their limitations of reach and funding, were in place and operational from the days afterwards.

4. PARTNER MAPPING

The partner landscape for Jamaica's education recovery reflects a combination of long-standing institutional relationships, post-disaster activation, and uncertainty driven by shifting external financing conditions. What follows is a preliminary mapping based on desk review and key informant interviews of some of the most important actors for the educational recovery process. A shorter summary of these groups is included as Annex E.

4.1 Multilateral and Bilateral Partners

The **World Bank** has a significant ongoing financial relationship with Jamaica's education sector, anchored by an existing loan with provisions for information systems strengthening and project management capacity across 56 priority secondary schools. The CERC mechanism embedded in the existing loan would, if triggered, provide additional resources specifically for education recovery; as noted, MoESYI has not requested activation. The Bank is also discussing potential new operations beyond secondary education, though details remain unconfirmed (Levin, 2026).

The **Inter-American Development Bank** also plays a key role in partnering with the MoESYI and has a USD 300 million emergency credit line activated across all sectors following Melissa, though education has not yet been defined within it. The IDB has not made a major education loan to Jamaica since 2015, and given that the IDB does not generally conduct humanitarian aid programmes, any IDB contribution to the education response would be medium-term at earliest. The IDB is planning its own detailed assessment of infrastructure, student tracking, and educational materials replacement (Arias, 2026).

FCDO's programming through the VPP represents an existing education-adjacent investment of GBP 15 million over six years, operating in 36 total schools with nearly half of those schools across seven volatile communities including in Westmoreland and St. James. The VPP is the principal vehicle through which FCDO has visibility into school-level dynamics in the Melissa response. FCDO's VAWG pilot mandate may also provide an additional lever for programming focus on the gendered dimensions of the response that are otherwise invisible in official reporting.

Canada announced JMD 1.5 billion in total humanitarian response and development assistance following Melissa, with an additional CAD 278,000 via the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives for education recovery, community peacebuilding, GBV prevention, and inclusive development (High Commission of Canada, 2026). No further education investments are forecasted at this time by Canada. The CFLI-funded education component includes "School in a Box" kits for 3,800 primary students in the western parishes through EduFocal and the Save our Boys and Girls Foundation, and the Hurricane Educational Restart Initiative providing materials and PSS for 630 students and 42 teachers in Westmoreland and St. James. Canada's programming is explicitly community-led and calls out GBV prevention as a priority, making it one of the few donors with a visible GBV lens in the education recovery space.

The **European Union**, through its Delegation to Jamaica, has maintained an active digital literacy programme and contributed satellite connectivity equipment to affected parishes in the immediate aftermath of Melissa. While the EU's education recovery engagement has been primarily technical rather than financial, its contribution to the connectivity infrastructure now being deployed across affected schools is a concrete and relevant input to learning continuity efforts (El Khadraoui, 2026).

The **US Government** provided humanitarian assistance in the immediate aftermath of Melissa, though education was not a defined priority within that response. USAID has historically been a supporter of education and violence prevention sectors, and Peace Corps Volunteers have maintained a presence in remote schools across the island. However, the 2025 reorganisation of US foreign assistance has created substantial uncertainty about future programming, and US embassy contacts indicated that further education investments or a Peace Corps return in Jamaica are unlikely in the near term.

4.2 UN Agencies

UNICEF is the most active UN agency in Jamaica's post-Melissa education response. As co-chair of the Education Technical Working Group, UNICEF has provided logistical support, PSS programming, teacher training, and child protection case management.

WFP assessed 90,000 families, supported food kits to 130,000 people, and delivered cash transfers to 64,000 individuals. The school feeding programme restart remains unconfirmed at time of writing, with WFP coordinating with UNICEF on WASH and kitchen infrastructure. WFP's toolkit for preparedness and shock-responsive school feeding represents a forward-looking resource for future shocks (WFP, 2026).

UNESCO is conducting a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment for the education sector using internationally recognised PDNA methodology, with the aim of producing a nationally owned recovery plan. In parallel, UNESCO has committed to supporting the printing of learning kits for grades 7 to 9; provided targeted grants to 100 student-teachers at Sam Sharpe Teachers College to cover accommodation, transportation, and learning materials; and launched the Women in Science Emergency initiative to support 20 graduate-level women scientists at UWI Mona whose research was disrupted by the hurricane (UNESCO, 2026).

4.3 NGOs

Research for this assessment did not include extensive interviews with local NGOs; the observations below are necessarily preliminary and based primarily on testimony from several key interviews and desk review.

Discussions with key stakeholders knowledgeable about the **NGO sector** suggest that organisations that scaled most effectively in the aftermath of Melissa share a common profile: deep community roots built over years of programming in the affected parishes, small and flexible organisational structures that allowed rapid deployment without bureaucratic delay, and contingency funding mechanisms (such as UNICEF contingency grants that released resources very quickly). Children First Agency reached over 5,000 children with six paid staff not because it had particular institutional capacity, but because it had trust and a large volunteer workforce that it engaged and deployed quickly. Eve for Life was operating across seven parishes within weeks of the hurricane not because it had a large budget, but because it had established relationships with the communities it serves. A lesson for donors is not simply that these organisations need more money (though they do). It is that their model—community embedded, lean, and trust based—is precisely what works quickly in disaster response, and that it deserves sustained investment between emergencies, not just emergency activation.

The **domestic philanthropic sector** also mobilised in important ways. The Jamaica Network of Corporate Foundations (led by the GraceKennedy Foundation's Caroline Mahfood) is coordinating large private philanthropy and is cognizant of the importance of education. Respondents noted that Sagcor, Sandals Foundation, the Jamaica National Foundation, and the Iprint Group of Companies were also identified as important contributors during the response.

The Sandals Foundation is actively rebuilding King's Primary and Infant and Culloden Primary and Infant in Westmoreland; the Jamaica National Foundation boosted scholarship support for affected students; the Iprint Group of Companies provided support to Park Mountain Primary; and the 2026 Sagcor Sigma Run set a JMD 150 million fundraising target for a group of named schools in the western parishes (MoESYI, January 2026; MoESYI, March 2026). The British Council adjusted its programming post-Melissa to reach accessible schools and to support PSS and teacher support (Campbell, 2026). The Rockhouse Foundation in Westmoreland, whose school is still being rebuilt, functions as a symbol of community-led resilience in the hardest-hit parish (Thwaites, 2026). These are illustrative examples of those who stepped up to organise and assist. Across all partner types, a consistent pattern emerges: strong operational engagement, but uneven financing and limited coordination in translating resources into system-wide recovery.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUILDING BACK BETTER

The Government of Jamaica has articulated three core priorities for the Building Back Better initiative for education sector recovery: reconstruction of school infrastructure, restoration of education services, and strengthening of national disaster preparedness systems (MoESYI, 2026). Recovery financing is expected to draw on a combination of domestic resources, international financing mechanisms, and development partner support, with the precise balance between loans and grants still to be determined.

The recommendations below are broadly aligned with those priorities, though they are not limited to them, and they are organised by audience rather than by source of funding, reflecting the reality that different actors have different leverage points and institutional mandates.

5.1 Government of Jamaica

School-as-shelter: MoESYI and ODPEM should establish a formal, time-bound transition protocol with clear responsibility and a hard deadline for returning every school building to educational use. No such protocol currently exists in codified form.

Student tracking: The yard-to-yard initiative should be sustained, and its conversion rate tracked. Every student who does not return to school is a potential statistic in the violence data within three to five years, and the window for intervention is closing.

School feeding: The national school feeding programme must be restarted meaningfully in all areas with whatever means available. Allowing the programme to remain dormant or inadequate anywhere while WFP and UNICEF emergency feeding winds down will create difficult decision points for students and families about returning to school or seeking alternative means for meeting basic needs.

Financing: The Government should explore whether activation of the Contingent Emergency Response Component (CERC) embedded in the existing World Bank secondary education loan is feasible, and it should engage with the IDB to define education as a priority within the USD 300 million emergency credit line already activated for Jamaica.

Disaster playbook: MoESYI should codify an education-specific disaster response playbook before June 2026. Agencies and local partners should know what triggers shelter transition timelines, what the contingent budget for school-level emergency response looks like, and how decisions cascade from ministry to region to school. The framework should incorporate the perspectives of parish disaster coordinators, the JDF, and ODPEM, and sustainability recommendations from the Caribbean Safe School Initiative.

Construction standards: MoESYI and NARA should incorporate the Caribbean Safe Schools framework into reconstruction specifications for every school rebuilt with public funding and use the current reconstruction process to update Jamaica's building codes for educational infrastructure, potentially drawing on expertise from the FCDO-funded smart hospitals initiative. All new and rebuilt schools should incorporate backup electricity, water storage sufficient to sustain operations through extended outages, and dedicated shelter areas physically separated from classrooms. The CHASE Fund's experience with ECIs offers a domestic proof of concept: its construction programme produced buildings that withstood Melissa while adjacent school structures did not.

Container classrooms: MoESYI should evaluate the feasibility of deploying container classrooms as a durable alternative to the fabric tents and tarps currently serving tens of thousands of students. Container structures offer weatherproof, semi-permanent learning spaces that can withstand seasonal rains and subsequent storm events. Regional Education Officers in the field have flagged this option as desirable.

Digital access: MoESYI should develop a digital access strategy for the western parishes that treats connectivity and device provision as resilience infrastructure rather than post-disaster relief. This should include an assessment of whether emergency satellite deployments like Starlink can be sustained beyond the emergency phase, and whether partnerships with domestic providers such as Digicel offer a more cost-effective long-term solution.

Special education: The capacity of regional offices to support students with special education needs has been significantly strained by the hurricane. In Region 3, the Regional Education Officer identified training additional qualified special education staff, particularly those with early literacy expertise, as an urgent priority given current staffing levels.

JETC reforms: The JETC reforms were commissioned by the Prime Minister and accepted by the government, but they remain only partially implemented. Government should recommit to specific milestones in data systems, regional governance, and accountability, engaging development partners and civil society around those milestones rather than new agenda-setting exercises.

EMIS: The continued development of systems-level data management should remain a priority. Ongoing efforts to strengthen and institutionalise EMIS so that student-level tracking across parish boundaries is possible are within reach and should not be subsumed by immediate priorities.

5.2 Donors

PSS funding: Donors should treat the need for PSS funding particularly in Regions 3 and 4 as an educational continuity priority on par with infrastructure, and should coordinate through the Education Technical Working Group to avoid duplication and fill geographic gaps in line with the NET's efforts to apportion services based on need and demand.

Financing gaps: Unmet need remains across school feeding, learning materials, remedial programming, and protection services without current financing plans. Donors with flexibility in their Jamaica portfolios should consider targeted contributions to close that gap. Those engaged on the social protection side should also advocate for an increase in PATH conditional cash transfer amounts, which Regional Education Officers describe as inadequate to making school attendance an economically rational choice for the most vulnerable households.

Coordination: Clearer division of labour and better data centralisation are actionable improvements that can be implemented now and at low cost. A partner matrix laying out who is doing what, where, and with what resources would reduce duplication and help smaller donors identify gaps. The NET could take responsibility for this, with donor financing for its design.

Private sector: The private sector and corporate foundation community has mobilised but lacks a shared view of where gaps remain. The Jamaica Network of Corporate Foundations provides an existing coordination platform, and NARA's mandate may offer a mechanism for businesses to contribute to rebuilding without navigating full procurement processes. Donors with convening power should help systematise this engagement.

5.3 NGOs and Civil Society

Scaling capacity: Community-embedded, lean organisations like Children First Agency, Eve for Life, and JYAN demonstrated remarkable capacity to scale in the aftermath of Melissa. That capacity should be recognised, resourced, and sustained between emergencies rather than treated as a temporary emergency asset.

Coordination: The protection and PSS response is fragmented across organisations with overlapping geographic mandates and no shared data system. A simple mapping of who is doing what in which communities, maintained through a single entity, would reduce duplication and help organisations identify where they are needed versus where others are already present.

VAWG documentation: For organisations with VAWG and child protection mandates, the priority is sustaining and deepening documentation of protection risks in the western parishes, including grooming, child labour, and abandonment. This documentation will be essential when donors and government assess whether the protection response was adequate.

JISA and independent schools: JISA represents 53 affected member schools across five parishes and is actively compiling damage data. NGOs and volunteer groups working in the independent school space should coordinate with JISA to avoid duplication and ensure private school communities are not excluded from the next phase of recovery support. JISA should also expand its reach beyond dues-paying accredited schools, as smaller and non-accredited schools serving the most vulnerable populations have the least access to public or private recovery support and need an advocate.

Church network: The Ecumenical Education Committee, headed by Ronald Thwaites, is a well-established network representing Jamaica's church school community that has not been fully integrated into the disaster response. With approximately half of Jamaica's primary schools church-owned or affiliated, and with denominations having demonstrated the capacity to mobilise quickly in communities where trust in national institutions is thin, this is a structural gap worth closing.

ANNEX A: KEY INFORMANTS CONSULTED

All interviews conducted 27 February – 18 March 2026, unless otherwise noted.

- Sharon Webber — Violence Prevention Partnership Lead, FCDO Jamaica
- Elena Arias — Jamaica Representative, Inter-American Development Bank
- Damien King — Co-Director, Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CAPRI)
- Elaine Foster Allen — National Council on Education
- Victoria Levin — Education Lead, World Bank Jamaica
- Stacey Clarke Callum — Independent consultant (also provided research support)
- Patricia Shako — Disaster risk financing specialist, independent consultant
- Rachael McDonald — Independent Consultant
- Rebecca Tortello — Education Lead, UNICEF Jamaica
- Richard Troupe — Director, MoESYI Safety and Security
- Tamar McKenzie / JISA Director
 - JISA focus group (7 non-public school directors; western parishes)
- Linda Campbell Miller — Region 3 Education Officer (MoESYI)
- Susan Nelson Smith — Region 5 Education Officer (MoESYI)
- Latoya Foster — CHASE Fund
- Rory McDonald — Community member, Bullet Tree, Westmoreland
- Damien Campbell — British Council Jamaica
- Claudette Pious — Children First Agency
- Ronald Thwaites — Former Minister of Education
- Joy Crawford — Director, Eve for Life
- Shanique Bowden — President, Jamaica Youth Advocacy Network (JYAN)
- Dana Sacchetti, Pedro Matos, Sarah Kohnstamm — World Food Programme
- Deidre Coy — Coordinator, Planning Institute of Jamaica
- Linverne Wright — Principal, William Knibb High School, Trelawny
- Rayon Simpson — Principal, Belmont Academy, Westmoreland
- Layla El Khadraoui — Programme Officer, Delegation of the EU to Jamaica

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ANNEX C: KEY FEATURES OF JAMAICA EDUCATION SYSTEM

Level	Key Features
Early Childhood Education	- Enrolment rate approximately 62% for ages 4–6; 12.2% decline in enrolment in 2023/24 attributed to falling birth rate - Only 23,077 of 94,217 enrolled children (3–5) are in public ECIs; the vast majority attend private or community-based settings - Only 302 of 2,320 ECIs held full Certificates of Registration (most operating below full ECC compliance standards) - Receives only ~3% of the national education budget despite evidence it is the highest-impact investment point in the system - Brain Builder Centres (BBCs) launched 2018 to close early childhood development gaps; 40 BBCs with 1,053 children enrolled 2023 Jamaica School Readiness Assessment: 57% of 4-year-olds did not require intervention; 36% required second-level screening; 7% required class monitoring
Primary Education	11,183 public teachers at primary level (2023/24), heavily female - Grade 4 Literacy Test: 63.4% mastery; males account for 74.4% of non-mastery (foundational literacy gap is gendered) - PEP Mathematics: 49% proficient nationally; girls (54.4%) outperform boys (44.4%) - School feeding subsidies: JMD 150/day (infant/grade 1–3), JMD 200/day (primary); PATH conditional cash transfers provide an additional JMD 150/day for eligible students (widely considered insufficient)
Secondary Education	13,540 teachers in public secondary schools (2023/24), 72% female; gross enrolment 115%, net enrolment 98% (signifying presence of over-age learners) - Only 19% of students met the five-subject CSEC matriculation requirement for tertiary entry; females nearly doubled males among qualifiers: 7,862 vs 4,323 - Boys drop out at significantly higher rates than girls from third form onward, directly feeding the pipeline to gang recruitment and violence - School feeding subsidy: JMD 280/day at secondary level; PATH transfers make attendance an economic decision for low-income families - Jamaica scored far below global averages and peer countries in all three PISA subjects in 2022; zero rural students reached high proficiency in any subject vs 7–8% of urban students
Special Education	77 schools supported by MoESYI Special Education Unit; provision includes schools for the blind, deaf, and intellectually disabled, plus 17 special education units and 28 resource rooms in primary schools 533 shadow/caregivers contracted by MoESYI (2023/24); 373 students receiving shadow support - Students with special needs significantly underserved in the post-Melissa response – no systematic tracking documented in available sources (Pious, 2026)
Tertiary and Vocational	- Five universities including UWI Mona; vocational training overseen by HEART/NST Trust across agriculture, IT, construction, tourism, and other sectors 69% of tertiary enrolled students are female; women graduate at ~3x the rate of men (the inverse of the male dropout pattern at secondary level) - TVET is a significant pathway for young men; HEART/NST Trust funding available.

Sources: PIOJ Economic and Social Survey Jamaica 2023 (published 2024); Jamaica Education Transformation Commission (JETC, 2022); Inter-American Dialogue Jamaica Report Card (2025); UNESCO Education Statistics; MoESYI. All enrolment and performance figures reflect the 2023/24 school year unless otherwise noted.

ANNEX D: SUMMARY OF IMPACTED REGIONS

Parish	Region	Schools	Enrolment	Staff	Impact Notes from Regions
St. Ann	3	80	37,832 (region)	2,543 (region)	Overall attendance 85%; secondary attendance 80%. 69 of 80 schools sustained damage (36 Priority 1, 29 Priority 2, 4 Priority 3). 114 of 121 Region 3 schools operating on whole-day basis. CSEC attendance 78%.
Trelawny	3	41			Overall attendance 76%; secondary attendance 67%, the lowest in the region. All 41 schools sustained damage (25 Priority 1, 15 Priority 2, 1 Priority 3). Some schools still without water and electricity four months post-Melissa. Road access disrupted. CSEC attendance 63%.
St. James	4	*59	*85,000 (region)	*4,000 (region)	28% absenteeism (Region 4 overall). Significant infrastructure damage. <i>Parish-level school data not obtained.</i>
Hanover	4	*40			Heavy infrastructure damage. Road access disrupted in early recovery period. <i>Parish-level school data not obtained.</i>
Westmoreland	4	*67			School-as-shelter use persisted into the fourth month post-Melissa. As of February, 50% of upper-form students had not returned to school. <i>Parish-level school data not obtained.</i>
St. Elizabeth/ Manchester	5	162	41,510 (region)	3,694 (region)	121 schools sustained damages due to the hurricane (half of them Priority 1-Critical). 483 students of secondary schools and 77 students of the primary schools were unaccounted for in February. Tourism sector damage in Manchester affecting household incomes and school fee payments.

Sources: Campbell Miller, 2026 (Region 3); Nelson Smith (Region 5), 2026; MoESYI, February 2026.

*Region 4 estimates (not confirmed from MoESYI at time of writing).

ANNEX E: PARTNER SUMMARY TABLES

Table 1: Select Jamaican National NGOs / Non-Profits

Organisation	Focus Areas	Notes
Teach Caribbean	Secondary education, English & Math, leadership	Well-known Jamaican NGO; strong programmatic credibility
Junior Achievement Jamaica	Financial literacy, work readiness, entrepreneurship	Long-standing, large footprint in primary & secondary schools
Youths For Excellence Limited	Literacy, numeracy, tutoring, inner-city youth	Strong grassroots reputation, expanding across Caribbean
Winsome Wishes for KIDS	Early literacy, teacher & parent support	Established and donor-facing
Young Jamaica Foundation	School supplies & access	Small, supply-focused donor
U.R.G.E.	School construction, health clinics, arts-based youth programming	High-profile, philanthropic
Children First Agency (CFA)	Child protection, PSS, adolescent wellness	Active post-Melissa response; runs Youth Wellness Centre and Bashy Bus Kru mobile health outreach; relevant to VAWG and adolescent health dimensions of assessment
Eve for Life	GBV prevention, MHPSS, sexual & reproductive health for women and girls	UNICEF implementing partner post-Melissa; reaching 225 adolescent girls in western parishes (Westmoreland, St. Elizabeth, Hanover); relevant for VAWG and PSS dimensions of assessment
Jamaica Teachers Association (JTA)	Teacher welfare, professional representation, school community liaison	direct reach into all schools; affected by Melissa as both institution and membership; relevant for teacher PSS and workforce recovery
Youth Education Association (Y.E.A.)	School supplies, educational devices, mentorship, career guidance	Youth led, grassroots

Table 2: Select International & Regional Education Partners Active in Jamaica

Organisation	Type	Role in Jamaica	Notes
World Bank	Multilateral lender	Large-scale education reform & secondary education projects; led post-Melissa GRADE	Contributed research; exploring recovery financing
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)	Multilateral lender	Early childhood, digital learning, policy reform	Monitoring and technical support; potential recovery financing
Caribbean Development Bank	Regional bank	Education infrastructure & access	Jointly provided comprehensive financial package to strengthen Jamaica's recovery and reconstruction efforts
UNICEF	UN agency	Education systems, child protection, PSS, digital modernization	Active response: PSS, Child Friendly Spaces, PFA training, ECI support, Eve for Life partnership, Education Sector Working Group co-chair
WFP	UN agency	School feeding programme support	Conducting feasibility assessment for School Feeding Programme restart
UNESCO	UN agency	Teacher development, curriculum & policy support	Conducting Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) for education sector at MoESYI request
UNFPA	UN agency	Sexual & reproductive health, GBV prevention	Relevant given VAWG dimensions of response; role post-Melissa unconfirmed in this assessment
British Council	International NGO	Teacher training & school leadership	VPP footprint and stakeholder coordination and convening power, ad hoc assistance
Global Partnership for Education	Global fund	Education system strengthening	Not active in Jamaica, but could play a future role
IsraAID	International NGO	Disaster response, PSS, education in emergencies	Part of post-Melissa Education Cluster in Jamaica

Table 3: Select Relevant Foundations and Private Charitable Trusts

Organisation	Focus Areas	Notes
GraceKennedy Foundation	Scholarship programs, teacher support, school infrastructure	Corporate foundation of GraceKennedy Group; significant national footprint; post-Melissa role to be confirmed
Digicel Foundation Jamaica	Digital literacy, technology in schools	Corporate foundation of Digicel; active in school technology programs nationally; post-Melissa role to be confirmed
The Jamaica National Foundation	School supplies, scholarships, youth programs	Linked to Jamaica National Group; community development focus; post-Melissa role to be confirmed
CHASE Fund (public)	Education, culture, health, sports funding via lottery revenues	Government-administered fund; significant source of education grants; key to understanding domestic financing landscape
Barita Foundation	Scholarships & Youth Development	Corporate foundation of Barita Investments (formerly Barita Education Foundation);
Sagicor Foundation	Education access, insurance, scholarships	Corporate foundation of Sagicor Life Jamaica; reported to have provided direct support to affected schools post-Melissa
Iprint Group of Companies	School reconstruction support	Donated to Park Mountain Primary post-Melissa