

## REQUEST RESPONSE

# Education Financing, Community Priorities, and Education in Emergencies (EiE) in the Sahel

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## A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This brief combines public education finance data from 5 central Sahel countries—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger—with how it relates to community stated education evidence from 19 African countries. More than half of primary and lower-secondary-age children are out of school, and learning poverty across the Sahel is estimated at around 90%<sup>1</sup>, meaning only one child in ten can read and understand a simple text by late primary age. Sahel governments already spend around 2.8–5.3% of GDP and up to about 20.3% of their total budgets on education. This translates into US \$100–380 per child per year<sup>2</sup> in primary school—lower than comparable African economies and too little to deliver quality schooling at scale. Official development assistance (ODA) in low-income countries is usually a small part of total education spending—even when combined with domestic financing; it falls far short of what is needed.<sup>3</sup> An extra \$1.9 billion is required for primary education alone to meet the demand of 10.6 million out of school children.

Education in Emergencies (EiE) funding by international donors like the UK is a clear area of impact and value for money. Education is not just about schools and learning—it has significant impacts on wider life chances, reproductive health, protection and mental health and psychosocial support especially in crises. Education is also not just about children, but also about adults who can potentially contribute to national development. For full country by country financial analysis see Annexes 1–5.

## Top Lines

1. People in the Sahel put education in their top priorities.<sup>4</sup> They see it as key to a better future with less conflict, better livelihoods and incomes, stronger trade, and greater peace and security. Poor families in

<sup>1</sup> 2021, UNICEF, Analysis of education spending in the West and Central Africa region: A Policy Brief for Ministers of Education and Finance.

<sup>2</sup> World Bank, Sahel Education White Paper, 2021 (Table 7, Figure 19 & 1.4.6) | 2023, World Bank/UNESCO, Education Finance Watch.

<sup>3</sup> 2023, World Bank/UNESCO, Education Finance Watch.

<sup>4</sup> 2026, O'Hagan, P. and McCarthy, G., Community Perspectives on Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, People First Impact Method (P-FIM) Evidence Series 2011–2025.

low-income countries spend significant amounts of their income on their children's education—up to 30% of total education expenditure (governments 55%, ODA 15%).<sup>5</sup> Household spending on education in Chad, Mauritania, and Mali up to 2019 was higher than their governments'.<sup>6</sup>

2. Education needs are extremely high in all 5 countries—domestic and community finance already carry most of the load, but a big gap is unfunded. ODA fills a small but critical part of total education spending that is firmly aligned with national, community, and household priorities—it is what people want. Over half of all children are out of school and want to be in education.
3. There is strong domestic financial commitment. However, education needs are far bigger than any domestic and community finance available, even if global education targets (SDG4) and extra spending on education and skills training are met.
4. In the Sahel, crises like conflict, displacement, drought, floods, and disease are now part of daily life and have international causes—including some the UK has contributed to. Education policy therefore must assume crisis as normal and plan for learning to continue, treating core education and EiE as one continuum—not separate silos, and linking planning and budgeting so education is included in any crisis response.
5. High defence spending alone cannot deliver lasting security, stability, or growth. In the long run, investing in education and social sectors is a more solid foundation for prosperity and social cohesion in the Sahel and supports the UK's long-term interests. There needs to be a better balance between defence, education, and other sectors. This should be with urgency or pay the costs later.
6. The Sahel's population is set to more than double, from about 86 million to nearly 200 million from 2020 to 2050.<sup>7</sup> Niger has the highest global fertility rate, and the other countries are in the top 25.<sup>8</sup>
7. UK education programmes help people live with dignity, build their skills and futures through crises, and cut wider risks for the UK at home and abroad. Targeted investment in fair, relevant education and practical skills training can make risky irregular migration and illicit drugs less attractive, build the workforce needed for growth, and when linked to enterprise, real jobs and trade become a tool for peacebuilding, climate resilience, democratic rule, and future UK-Africa trade.
8. The region sits at the crossroads of land and sea routes to Europe. Conflict, climate stress, and a lack of access to quality education and livelihoods, push young people to move for a better future.
9. Border areas and local economies blend into each other, so instability spreads easily and affects nearby coastal states.
10. The UK has strong trade links and large diaspora communities in nearby West African countries. Trade with Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia is worth about GBP 9.8 billion a year (DBT<sup>9</sup>).

## Key messages

1. Budgets that match what people value most—safe, functioning, relevant learning—delivers better education, stronger government legitimacy and better long-term economic and security prospects. Linking finance to community priorities and trust is the best way to get value for money and build sustainable education in the Sahel.
2. Those closest to the problem are closest to the solution. People are more than their needs—even in crisis

<sup>5</sup> 2023, World Bank/UNESCO, Education Finance Watch.

<sup>6</sup> World Bank, Sahel Education White Paper, 2021 (Figure 19 & 1.4.6).

<sup>7</sup> World Bank, Sahel Education White Paper, 2021.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid - average fertility is 6.4 children per woman vs 4.7 for Sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>9</sup> 2025, UK Department for Business and Trade (DBT), UK trade in goods and services by country, 12 months to June 2025.

they have skills, ideas, and solutions. Focusing only on “needs” creates shopping lists, while focusing on what people do or can do opens space to build on their capacities and existing action. Communities already know what keeps learning going, and in a time of shrinking aid, support should back people-led efforts, not treat communities as passive and waiting recipients.

3. Community evidence<sup>10</sup> shows people are clear about what makes schooling work in crises: reliable and present teachers, safe access routes, open schools, and affordable costs. These are relatively low-cost, high-impact investments that can guide UK education engagement in the Sahel. Closed schools contribute to the break down of what holds societies together.
4. In Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger, just over half of primary and lower-secondary-age children are out of formal school. A low-cost, high-impact step is to add basic reading and maths to poor informal Islamic schools (Madrassas) with better basic living conditions—creating safe routes to primary school—based on community led risk, context analysis and leadership.
5. Governments and partners should hold education budgets at 4-6% of GDP and 15-20% of total public spending, in line with SDG4 FFA benchmarks, and encourage Public Expenditure Tracking and related accountability tools to ensure funds reach all schools.
6. Central Sahel domestic budgets cover 70-95% of education spending, but there is a big gap between what is formally approved and what is spent and reaches schools (execution). Weak capacity, poor systems and limited transparency mean money often fails to reach the “last mile”, so officials say they have “no budget” and communities see little change despite clear commitments on paper. More can be done to innovate, lower costs, and work with the grain of community action, and The UK can play a key role.
7. There is some good news. Between 2023 and 2025, Burkina Faso and Mali met or passed global SDG4 education spending benchmarks. Niger, Chad and Mauritania still fall short on at least one SDG4 benchmark.
8. Education in Emergencies (EiE) is almost entirely donor-funded, makes up only 1-3% of total education spending, and mostly sits outside national budgets. Yet at the local level, it is often the most visible funding, as humanitarian support builds classrooms and facilities, keeps food insecure children in class, and often helps displaced rural or nomadic children into school for the first time and often at much better quality—showing the value of these investments.
9. Recent projections suggest that total education ODA may decline by a quarter between 2023-2027.<sup>11</sup> This will put additional pressure on already constrained domestic and external financing for education—you get back what you fail to pay for through social breakdown, conflict, and poverty.

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid. Across 56 People First Impact Method (P-FIM)<sup>10</sup> exercises in 19 African countries and the engagement of over 5,000 people from different representative community groups, people link education to dignity, safety, and stability, describing it as “*the only inheritance we can give our children*.”

<sup>11</sup> 2025, UNESCO, Global Education Monitoring Report Team, *Aid to education: Time for tough decisions*. Policy Paper 50.

## A. WHAT IS THE ALLOCATION FOR EDUCATION IN THE BUDGETS OF SAHEL COUNTRIES?

This section looks at education expenditure as a percent of GDP; percent of government expenditure; and the breakdown between domestic and donor financing.

Country	Total education budget <sup>12</sup> 2023	Education expenditure % of GDP	Education expenditure % of total gov spending	EiE as % of total education	Donor share of total education %	Estimated <sup>13</sup> EiE cost per child/year
Burkina Faso	870 bn XOF (\$1.45bn)	5.3	20.3	0.8	24	\$73
Chad	255.6 bn XAF (\$419m)	3.2	16.5	3.5	10	\$81
Mali	590 bn XOF (\$1.04bn)	4.2	19.1	1	5	\$108
Mauritania	MRU 5.17 bn (\$130m)	2.8	12	1.4	12	\$50
Niger	420 bn XOF (\$423m)	4.1	12.8	1.5	15	\$91
<b>SDG4 FFA benchmark</b>		<b>4-6</b>	<b>15-20</b>			

Education spending across the Sahel varies between 2.8% and 5.3% of GDP and 12–20% of total government expenditure. The Education 2030 Framework for Action (FFA) benchmarks 4–6% of GDP and 15–20% of public spending provide the global reference for adequate education financing. Realistically this minimum standard is far below what is required in the Sahel which has the highest global population growth and fertility rates.

In 2023, Burkina Faso (5.3% of GDP; 20.3% of expenditure) and Mali (4.2%; 19.1%) demonstrated comparatively strong financial commitment to education, achieving or exceeding both benchmarks. These levels, reached amid severe security pressures and constrained financial space, reflect deliberate political prioritisation of education as a pillar of national stability and socio-economic recovery.

By contrast, Niger (4.1% of GDP; 12.8% of expenditure), Chad (3.2%; 16.5%), and Mauritania (2.8%; 12.0%) remain below one or both FFA benchmarks, revealing how constrained domestic revenues, heavy debt servicing, defence spending, and subsidy burdens continue to limit financial room for the education sector.

<sup>12</sup> Total budget includes all sub-sectors: pre-primary, primary, secondary, Technical/Vocational (TVET) and higher education. Figures for 2023 are the most reliable according to the data available.

<sup>13</sup> Figures are based on the UNICEF Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal for each country for 2023/2024.

Across the region, domestic resources finance between 70% and 95% of total education spending, confirming that governments are the principal funders of education. This is significant. Mali and Chad cover nearly all sector costs domestically, while Burkina Faso and Niger depend more heavily on external partners—donors contribute roughly 15%-25% of total education funding. Mauritania’s domestic contribution (88% of core education finance) indicates gradual integration of externally financed projects into the state budget and progress toward inclusion of refugees and vulnerable learners in public schools.

In absolute terms, annual education budgets range from roughly \$130 million (Mauritania) to over \$1.5 billion (Burkina Faso and Mali). However, recurrent expenditures—mainly teacher salaries—absorb up to 85% of these budgets, leaving limited financial space for quality enhancement, resilience, or emergency preparedness. Even where allocations meet global benchmarks, low execution rates, high demand, and delayed capital spending weaken impact in schools and wider socio-economic recovery.

From a community perspective, the measure of progress is not the size of allocations but their translation into tangible improvements: safe, accessible, functioning schools; reliable and present teachers; and education relevant to social and economic life. Financial performance must therefore be accompanied by stronger delivery, accountability, and community engagement so that public investment in education translates into learning outcomes, community trust, and socio-economic development across the Sahel.

## B. WHAT IS THE PRIMARY EDUCATION FUNDING GAP FOR OUT OF SCHOOL CHILDREN?<sup>14</sup>


Country	Approx. out of school children	Government spend per Primary student per year (PPP)	Additional required
Burkina Faso	1.6 m	\$272	US\$ 435m
Mali	2 m	\$284	US\$ 570m
Niger	3.5 m	\$112	US\$ 390m
Chad	3 m	\$99	US\$ 300m
Mauritania	0.54 m	\$380	US\$ 205m

This section clearly shows that even with existing government, household, and ODA contributions, existing funding is not enough against demand. New and innovative models are required to address the challenges at scale with better impact and value for money—not business as usual. This can only be done by engaging better with community capacities and knowledge.

<sup>14</sup> Sources: World Bank, UNESCO, GPE, UNICEF.

## C. WHAT IS THE ALLOCATION FOR EDUCATION IN EMERGENCIES (EiE)?

This section looks at estimated EiE financing as a percent of GDP and/or the education budget and the split between domestic and donor financing.



Across the Sahel, EiE financing remains marginal within national education budgets almost entirely dependent on humanitarian and external partners. While overall education allocations have increased in several countries, the share dedicated to EiE rarely exceeds 1–2% of total education financing, and most humanitarian contributions remain off-budget, channelled through the UN Humanitarian Response Plans (HRPs) or parallel project mechanisms. EiE remains a fragile, donor-dependent component of total education finance. HRPs—managed by OCHA and implemented through partners—are the primary vehicles for EiE funding yet remain almost entirely off-budget and disconnected from national treasury systems. Domestic allocations rarely exceed 1–2% of total education budgets, and few countries have introduced coded EiE budget lines or sub-programmes. The absence of predictable, on-budget EiE financing undermines planning continuity and leaves crisis-affected children dependent on short-term humanitarian appeal funding.

### Burkina Faso

In 2023, Burkina Faso devoted 5.3% of GDP and 20.3% of total public expenditure to education, meeting both SDG 4 and Education 2030 Framework for Action (FFA) benchmarks. Domestic resources accounted for roughly 75% of total education financing, with external resources providing the remaining 25%. The education budget rose from 870 bn XOF (\$1.45bn) in 2023 to about 916 bn XOF (\$1.53bn) in 2025—a nominal 5% increase—while the Ministry of National Education, Literacy and Promotion of National Languages (MENAPLN) allocation grew from 400 bn XOF (\$670m) to 469 bn XOF (\$780m). Despite this growth, EiE funding remains marginal—about 0.7–0.9% of total education expenditure—with no distinct budget line or government contribution to HRP education activities. EiE support continues to be provided primarily by Education Cannot Wait (ECW), UNICEF, and other partners.

### Chad

Chad allocated 3.2% of GDP (below the SDG 4 benchmark) and 16.5% of total public expenditure to education in 2023 (within the SDG 4 benchmark range for government total spending). Education financing is projected to remain between 2.2–2.6% of GDP through 2025, far short of sector requirements. Domestic resources cover roughly 90% core education spending, with external financing providing the remaining 10%—but low capital

execution, weak systems and reliance on off-budget humanitarian support still leave major gaps in what reaches schools. Off-budget partners—notably UNICEF, Education Cannot Wait, and the World Bank—finance complementary programmes aligned with national priorities. Under the UN Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), total education financing (core + humanitarian) reached \$434 million in 2023 (\$419m + \$15m EiE), \$540 million in 2024, and \$641 million in 2025. These HRP allocations represent the entire EiE envelope, entirely donor-funded and off-budget. Although nominal education spending rose by nearly 50% since 2023, the sector's share of the national budget has slightly declined, underscoring persistent dependence on external partners and limited domestic financial space. Sahel-wide analysis also shows that in Chad household spending on education has, in recent years, exceeded public spending, underscoring how families and communities are committed to education and are trying to fill gaps in a constrained public system.

## Mali

Mali devoted 4.2% of GDP and 19.1% of public expenditure to education in 2023, broadly aligned with the FFA benchmarks. Education investment, valued at roughly 600 billion XOF (\$1.0–1.1bn), remains 95% domestically financed, with external projects providing about 5%. While Mali meets the benchmark ratios, the system's efficiency challenges—including high repetition and dropout rates consuming around 16% of total spending—constrain quality and reach. EiE support is limited: although UNICEF and ECW implement complementary humanitarian programmes aligned with the sector plan, there have been no government contributions to the UN HRP since 2019. The downward trend in global education ODA increases the urgency of protecting domestic allocations to avoid contraction of crisis-response capacity.

## Mauritania

Mauritania's education spending remains below benchmarks, averaging 2.8–3.0% of GDP and 12–16% of public expenditure. While there is no UN HRP for Mauritania, humanitarian education assistance is integrated through the UNHCR Refugee Response and Resilience Plan (3RP), which allocated \$152 million for Malian refugees and host communities in the Hodh Chargui Region for 2025. Education represents roughly 10–12% of this, equivalent to \$4.5–5.5 million, with an 85% funding gap. The education component of the 3RP aligns with the Government's *Budgeted Action Plan (BAP)* under the National Education Sector Development Plan (PNDSE III, 2023–2030) and supports curriculum reform, refugee inclusion, and girls' retention. The 2025 State Budget allocates 5.17 billion MRU (\$130m) to education investment, while external and humanitarian inputs remain essential to sustain inclusive service delivery primarily to Malian refugees and host communities.

## Niger

In 2023, Niger spent 4.1% of GDP and 12.8% of government expenditure on education—meeting the GDP benchmark but below the total public expenditure target. The government has pledged to increase the education share to 22% of total spending by 2025. The 2025 budget set total expenditure at 3,033 billion XOF (\$5bn), maintaining a 22% target, equivalent to about 560 billion XOF (\$930m) for education. Despite financial commitment, EiE financing remains modest: \$10.9 million in 2023, \$27.1 million in 2024, and \$21.6 million in 2025, all sourced through humanitarian appeals (HRPs) and representing less than 2% of total education financing each year. Combined education and EiE spending is projected to rise from about \$710 million in 2023 to around \$1.1 billion by 2025, illustrating that while domestic funding dominates, the humanitarian envelope remains extremely small. There have been no recorded government contributions to HRPs since 2022.

The lesson across the Sahel is clear: At its heart, the case for EiE is about people, not crisis or emergencies. Emergencies are a part of life. People are not defined by them—communities live and survive through crisis and continue to act, recover, and rebuild. Though they may suffer and die, they are not defined by emergencies. For communities, education is central to protection and socio-economic recovery. People believe in what they can become before, during, and after disasters. Education must therefore continue in times of crisis, and emergency support must be holistic, integrated, and empowering. Integrating EiE into national planning and budgeting—as a standard function of the entire education system and approach rather than an external project—is essential for good governance, transparency, economic sustainability, and national ownership. It is also about always engaging communities. Until this shift occurs, the region's education response will remain reactive, fragmented, and underfunded, despite strong community demand and government commitment to the broader education sector.

## D. WHY ARE GOVERNMENTS NOT ALLOCATING MORE TO EDUCATION/EIE? WHAT IS THE POLITICAL ECONOMY BEHIND THIS?

Two dominant pressures define this political economy: guns and graft (corruption). Governments across the Sahel face overlapping financial, political, and institutional constraints that limit their ability to increase allocations to education—particularly EiE. Rising defense costs (4-5% GDP) and debt servicing reduce financial space. Transparency International (2023) ranks Sahel States among the most corruption prone. People First Impact Method (P-FIM) evidence<sup>15</sup> reveals communities identify four consistent obstacles: unpaid teachers, insecurity, climate damage to schools and access, and affordability barriers including corruption. The disconnect between budgets and community priorities erodes public trust and pushes families toward informal Islamic schooling<sup>16</sup> that, while highly valued, lacks integration with government systems and formal literacy and numeracy.

### Security and Financial Pressures

Since 2015, military expenditure in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad has risen from roughly 2-3% to over 4-5% of GDP, consuming up to one-quarter of discretionary budgets (SIPRI 2024). The World Bank (2021) and UNESCO (2022) both warn that escalating defense costs are crowding out investment in human development and social sectors. Debt servicing, energy subsidies, and the financial impact of insecurity further reduce available space for education.

Even when education budgets rise nominally, weak domestic revenue collection, volatile commodity prices, and limited financial buffers restrict their sustainability. Countries such as Chad and Niger remain below or only partially meet the international benchmarks (4-6% of GDP; 15-20% of expenditure). Chad's low capital execution and Niger's narrow revenue base exemplify how financial fragility constrains scale-up.

### Governance and Corruption Constraints

Persistent corruption and weak financial governance further erode the effectiveness of education spending. IMF fiscal-transparency reviews report consistently low budget execution rates, while Transparency

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<sup>15</sup> O'Hagan, P., McCarthy, G. (2026). *Community Perspectives on Education Sub-Saharan Africa*. People First Impact Method (P-FIM) Evidence Series 2011-2025.

<sup>16</sup> O'Hagan, P. (2024), *Koranic and Secular Education in the Sahel – FDCO Policy Recommendations*.

International (2023) ranks Sahel countries among the most corruption-prone globally—with Chad and Niger near the top of global corruption indices. Corruption manifests through misappropriation of funds, ghost teachers, illicit school fees, and procurement anomalies and inefficiencies.<sup>17</sup> These leakages, highlighted by communities as critical to effective education, reduce the real value of public investment and significantly weaken community confidence in the state’s capacity to deliver education equitably.

In Mali, high repetition and dropout rates consume around 16% of education spending (0.6% of GDP)—a structural inefficiency that diverts resources from quality improvement and crisis response. Across the region, fragmented donor projects and off-budget funding undermine treasury ownership and accountability, preventing coherent planning and financial oversight.

## Institutional Fragmentation and EiE Exclusion

The persistent separation between humanitarian and development financing prevents ministries from treating EiE as a permanent budget function and to be held accountable by communities and donors. In Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Chad, EiE funds remain almost entirely donor-financed but managed outside government systems, reinforcing dependency and limiting long-term planning. Without dedicated EiE budget codes or sub-programmes, governments cannot systematically finance preparedness, recovery, or resilience measures. As a result, national education systems remain reactive rather than anticipatory—addressing emergencies mostly when donors intervene.

## Community Priorities and Trust Deficit

Community perspectives gathered through the People First Impact Method (P-FIM) highlight a striking disconnect between financial policy and social economic priorities. Across dozens of exercises, communities consistently rank education as their top recovery and protection priority within emergencies, describing education and training as a source of dignity, safety, hope, and economic recovery. Yet, national budgets rarely fund the local enablers communities identify as essential: reliable teachers, safe routes to school, school feeding, and temporary emergency learning spaces. Some of these are “low hanging fruit” from a cost and investment perspective when mainstreamed in government education investment support by donors.

“The Government has dumped us in a trash can they call education.”

*Self-directed youth learners,  
Chad.*

This mismatch reflects a political economy shaped by insecurity and short-term financial imperatives, where governments prioritise immediate security control over social investment. The result is a trust deficit: communities perceive education systems as underperforming and inequitable, even when budgets rise. Without stronger transparency, delivery, and accurate information, financial commitments will continue to fall short of building learning outcomes, public legitimacy, and long term economic and security impacts.

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<sup>17</sup> A. Dieng, 2021, “Corruption and the State in the Sahel,” *Corruption and State-Building in the Sahel: The Oxford Handbook of the African Sahel*, L. Villalon (ed).

## E. WHAT WOULD ENCOURAGE GOVERNMENTS TO INCREASE DOMESTIC FINANCING FOR EI E?

This section looks at the political, financial, and strategic levers and the role of external incentives or conditions.

### Political, Financial, and Strategic Levers:

- Frame education as a peace and stability investment.
- Improve efficiency in teacher deployment and resource use.
- Earmark domestic revenues (e.g., telecoms, extractives) for education.
- Integrate EiE to national education strategies and financial planning.
- Integrate community engagement as the basis for accountability and ownership.

### External Incentives:

- Co-financing and conditional donor tranches linked to domestic performance.
- Peer learning and regional competition (e.g., Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger).
- Embed community-based evidence into policy dialogue to connect finance and outcomes.

## F. HOW CAN DONORS EFFECTIVELY ADVOCATE FOR GREATER DOMESTIC INVESTMENT IN EI E?

This section looks at recommended advocacy strategies and approaches, and the use of conditional financing, co-financing, and peer learning.

Education in the Sahel is not only an economic or developmental issue—it is a profoundly human one. As UNESCO (2021) affirms, *“the will to learn is universal and intrinsic to human dignity,”* and the World Bank (2021) describes education as *“a singular force to prevent violence.”* P-FIM evidence<sup>18</sup> reinforces these truths—even amid conflict, displacement, and crisis, families sustain schooling as an intentional future-orientated act focussed on protecting and developing their children’s capacities for development and livelihoods. Across Sahelian communities, parents and elders describe education as *“the only reliable inheritance we can give our children”*—a pathway to dignity, identity, protection, livelihoods, and peace.

### Reframing Advocacy Around Humanity and Cultural Legitimacy

Effective advocacy for greater domestic investment in EiE must begin with people—with families, communities, and the moral and cultural meanings they attach to learning. The will to learn and to question is part of human identity, embedded in every culture and generation. In the Sahel, reconnecting education policy to this lived reality—to people’s identities as Africans, communities, and believers in education — builds a natural political will to invest.

This perspective aligns with the African Union’s Continental Education Strategy for Africa (CESA) and UNESCO-IIEP (2022), which stress the importance of integrating Islamic and community schools into national education frameworks—embedding education within local systems that people recognise as legitimate and improving their quality and inclusiveness. This strengthens both social cohesion and state legitimacy. Education

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<sup>18</sup> O’Hagan, P., McCarthy, G. (2026). *Community Perspectives on Education in Sub-Saharan Africa*. People First Impact Method (P-FIM) Evidence Series 2011–2025.

becomes not just a service, but a social contract between governments and their people: a contract that when delivered, fosters trust, stability, and peace.

## Linking Financial Dialogue with Human Outcomes

Advocacy must connect financial dialogue to people’s lived experience—translating the moral and social value of education into measurable budget priorities. In fragile and conflict affected contexts, peace and development cannot be built through coercion or military dominance; they depend on the everyday functioning of schools as safe spaces where children learn to get on with each other. Embedding education within each community, including in informal Islamic and traditional systems, provides the most credible foundation for stability and recovery.

EiE is critical to preventing deeper social breakdown. It addresses multiple long-term outcomes across sectors: economic growth, reproductive health including early marriage and early pregnancy, protection especially for girls, gender equity, and mental health and psychosocial support. Sustained education access during crisis periods mitigates the “hidden long term costs” of fragility and helps rebuild inter-community trust and between communities and the state.

## Strategic Approaches for Donor Advocacy

Donors can most effectively advocate for greater domestic investment in EiE by aligning financial incentives with government priorities and grounding community and stakeholder dialogue in evidence that links financial performance to social outcomes. Advocacy that blends technical credibility and human meaning is the most persuasive at policy level.

## Recommended Approaches:

- Present P-FIM evidence and community testimonies during Joint Sector Reviews and public finance dialogues to demonstrate how education financing builds legitimacy, trust, and resilience.
- Promote the message “Education in Emergencies is about building the social-economic future, not surviving the crisis.”<sup>19</sup>
- Maintain education’s benchmark share (4-6% of GDP; 15-20% of expenditure) while ensuring a coded EiE sub-programme within the national budget structure.
- Progressively shift from fragmented project funding to partial on-budget integration, starting with joint financial reporting and co-financed budget lines under strengthened transparency and Public Expenditure Tracking mechanisms. Given donor concerns over fiduciary risk, this process should be phased and anchored in measurable governance reforms—including digital expenditure tracking, third-party audits, and most importantly community-based last mile accountability.
- Use conditional and peer-based incentives to reward domestic effort—for example, catalytic tranches released when governments reach agreed domestic financing thresholds or sustain school operations in conflict-affected areas and community developed success indicators.
- Encourage peer learning among Sahel countries. Burkina Faso and Mali already demonstrate that maintaining benchmarks is feasible, while Niger’s 22% public-expenditure target signals ambition and regional momentum.

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<sup>19</sup> This needs to be defined by communities in the Sahel themselves in their concepts and worldviews, e.g. through P-FIM engagement, so that it is their truths and not that of outsiders.

- Support joint donor–government reviews bringing together the ministries of finance, education, and interior alongside partners to monitor EiE budget–code execution and link financial data with indicators of community trust and relevance.
- Support peer learning and competition through regional exchanges of the Protecting Education from Attack Coalition’s, Safe Schools Declaration (SSD) (of which the UK is a signatory). This could be extended for example to exchanges on informal Islamic Education and Mother Tongue Instruction<sup>20</sup> or education for nomadic pastoralists<sup>21</sup>—all of which should go with the organic and emergent trends in the region and not be driven by outsiders. Exchanges need to bring the periphery to the centre—decision-makers listening, and communities speaking truth to power.

## A Coherent Message: People, Finance, and Peace

Even where benchmarks are met, execution gaps, teacher shortages, and low public trust constrain outcomes. Communities consistently associate educational value with visible improvements—safe schools, teacher presence, and relevance to daily social-economic life—not with budget size. Effective advocacy for domestic investment in EiE requires connecting budgets to people’s lived experience. Financial reform and social legitimacy are inter-connected. When governments finance what communities value most—safe, functioning, and relevant schools—budgets become instruments of social cohesion and stability. Education, as communities remind us and as UNESCO has written, is “*a singular force to prevent violence and help mitigate risks associated with fragility and adversity.*” By anchoring advocacy in both financial evidence and community voice, donors can help governments across the Sahel transform education financing from an expenditure line into a national covenant for stability, dignity, and hope.

## G. WHAT RELEVANT EXAMPLES OR LESSONS EXIST ACROSS WEST AFRICA AND BEYOND?

This section looks at positive case studies where domestic education financing increased, and experiences integrating EiE into national planning and budgeting.

### Positive Case Studies where Domestic Education Financing Increased

Despite persistent insecurity, displacement, and climate shocks, several Sahel governments have demonstrate political ownership and financial commitment to education. Burkina Faso and Mali have maintained or exceeded international benchmarks (4–6% of GDP and 15–20% of public spending) even under severe financial strain, signalling that sustained domestic prioritisation is possible in fragile contexts.

- **Burkina Faso:** Education spending reached 5.3% of GDP and 20.3% of public expenditure in 2023. Despite conflict and financial constraints, the Government continues to protect core education funding and has created an *inter-ministerial steering committee* to oversee implementation of the Safe Schools Declaration (SSD) (Decree of 14 August 2023)<sup>22</sup>.
- **Mali:** With 4.2% of GDP and 19.1% of expenditure devoted to education, Mali maintains benchmark-level spending and national coordination of the Safe Schools Declaration through a government-led

<sup>20</sup> O’Hagan, P. Mother Tongue Language Integration in Sahel State Education Systems.

<sup>21</sup> O’Hagan, P. Nomadic Pastoralism and Education in The Sahel.

<sup>22</sup> World Vision, 2023, Sahel SSD Implementation Study 2023.

committee and decentralised technical teams<sup>23</sup>. Mali has led the way on implementation of the Safe Schools Declaration including the successful removal of soldiers from schools. There was a joint Civil Society and Government SSD visit to Mali with delegations joining from Burkina Faso and Niger in 2023.

- **Mauritania:** Although allocations remain below global targets, the Education Law 2022–2023 has legally enshrined *refugee inclusion* in national schools. Domestic integration of previously external projects is improving accountability and financial coherence.<sup>24</sup>
- **Niger:** The Ministry of Education operates a dedicated *emergency coordination unit* and has validated an Accelerated Education Programme for emergency zones, ensuring that crisis-affected learners are included within national plans.<sup>25</sup>
- **Chad:** The Ministry of National Education and Civic Promotion (MENPC) chairs the national EiE coordination mechanism and includes an internal EiE Division, improving leadership and cross-ministerial collaboration.<sup>26</sup> Chad has earned international recognition for its welcoming and inclusive approach to refugees and legal recognition to the same rights and access to services as Chadian citizens.

## Experiences Integrating EiE into National Planning and Budgeting

Across the Sahel, governments increasingly recognise—at least verbally—that “all education is Education in Emergencies.” Ministries have begun to establish *EiE directorates, units, or coordination mechanisms* within their structures to link emergency response with sector planning. This has strengthened institutional resilience and clarified leadership for humanitarian-development coordination.

However, the absence of dedicated EiE budget codes or sub-programmes continues to limit financial investment, transparency, and continuity. Where EiE is treated as a general education expenditure, crisis-specific needs risk being obscured within recurrent budgets. Formalising EiE within education sector programmes—through *coded budget lines* and *joint monitoring with finance ministries*—would ensure predictable resourcing, traceable expenditure, and improved accountability.

“We are the experts in Education in Emergencies—whenever there is an emergency, the agencies run away.”

*Displaced women, South Sudan.*

Community evidence<sup>27</sup> in disasters shows that keeping children learning in schools throughout has important protection, mental health, and psychosocial support benefits. Planning and response needs to consider the entire school and learning context. For example, restoring and maintaining access to schools immediately after floods and other natural disasters (e.g. through bridge and road repair) is critically important. Likewise targeted emergency school feeding during severe food insecurity is critical to sustaining enrolment, learning, and normalcy.

Countries that have integrated EiE into their national planning and coordination frameworks demonstrate greater policy coherence and readiness to absorb donor funding through on-budget mechanisms. These

<sup>23</sup> ICRC, 2023, Law & Policy.

<sup>24</sup> UNHCR, 2024, Mauritania Inclusion Factsheet.

<sup>25</sup> World Vision, 2023 SSD Implementation Report; Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) News, September 2024.

<sup>26</sup> UNHCR Teachers in Refugee/Displacement Settings – Chad Case Study 2025; ODI Education Planning Note 2020.

<sup>27</sup> O'Hagan, P., McCarthy, G. (2025). *Community Perspectives on Education Sub-Saharan Africa*. People First Impact Method (P-FIM) Evidence Series 2010–2025.

experiences show that domestic ownership and institutionalisation of EiE within public finance systems are key to sustainability.

## Lessons learned

Political ownership, legal reform, and the institutionalisation of EiE within national education and budget frameworks are the strongest predictors of resilience and sustainability. When governments commit resources, create formal structures, and link them to community priorities, education becomes both a stabilising force and a foundation for peace and economic development across the Sahel. The most lasting value-for-money investments build on community agency and priorities—financing the enablers that communities themselves identify as essential to sustaining learning and hope.

## H. WHAT ARE THE MAIN ADVOCACY POINTS THAT CAN BE USED WITH GOVERNMENTS?

This section looks at suggested messaging and narratives; and economic, social, and political rationale for prioritising education/EiE.

### Suggested Messaging and Narratives

Advocacy for greater domestic investment in education and EiE in the Sahel must combine financial evidence with human meaning. Ministers of finance and education respond most effectively when arguments link financial responsibility to national legitimacy, peace, and public trust. The following messages resonate most across the region and are rooted in P-FIM evidence:

- Education is the Sahel's strongest defence against violence and poverty. It reduces vulnerability to conflict and radicalisation, providing the social glue that binds divided communities.
- Schools and teachers are the visible face of the state and a source of hope. A functioning school signals government presence and stability in areas where communities feel abandoned.
- Communities already invest in education; governments must match the will of communities. Across the Sahel, families start schools, build classrooms, organise temporary lessons, and pay and sustain local teachers. They set up temporary learning spaces in emergencies. Public policy must recognise and amplify this civic commitment.
- Education enablers repeatedly cited include: stabilising teacher presence, school feeding, ensuring safe access including post flooding, and adequate sanitation.
- Barriers include: unpaid teachers, insecurity, inadequate infrastructure, gender discrimination, and hidden costs.
- Education in Emergencies is about building the future, not surviving the crisis. Education must be protected as an essential service, even in crisis, ensuring teachers are paid, schools remain open and accessible, and children continue learning—social cohesion and social economic fabric breaks down when schools are closed—the damage is long term.

These messages resonate because they place people, communities, stability, and economies at the centre of financial decision-making. They turn abstract percentages into lived experiences of resilience, hope, legitimacy, community, and nation building.

## Economic, Social, and Political Rationale for Prioritising Education/EiE

Investment in education—and specifically in EiE—delivers high long-term returns across multiple aspects of national development and stability:

### Economic rationale:

- Education enhances economic productivity, employment, and resilience to economic shocks.
- Sustained public investment in education accelerates growth and trade and supports diversification away from resource dependency.
- Every pound invested in education generates multiple dividends in lifetime earnings and public revenue.

### Social rationale:

- Education reduces poverty, gender inequality, and inter-generational exclusion.
- It strengthens community cohesion and addresses grievances that fuel conflict.
- EiE keeps social systems functioning during crisis, maintaining child protection, health awareness, and mental health and psychosocial well-being.

### Political rationale:

- Visible delivery of education services reinforces state legitimacy and trust.
- Schools and teachers embody the social contract between communities and government.
- Investing in EiE mitigates the long-term humanitarian and financial costs of displacement and insecurity by preventing collapse of basic services.

Education is not an optional expenditure but a strategic investment in peace, stability, and national identity. Aligning budgets with community priorities—particularly around teacher stability, safety, and relevance—ensures spending translates into legitimacy and value for money.

## I. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Formalise EiE as a dedicated component of education budgets, with coded lines and transparent reporting.
2. Protect benchmark shares of public expenditure (4–6% of GDP and 15–20% of total government spending).
3. Stabilise the teacher workforce through predictable pay and professional support.
4. Fund key enablers such as school feeding, safe access, and essential infrastructure.
5. Integrate trust and relevance indicators into education monitoring frameworks to link financial performance with community confidence.
6. Bridge humanitarian and development finance to ensure continuity between crisis and recovery.
7. Incentivise domestic mobilisation through co-financing and conditional funding mechanisms tied to performance.

## CONCLUSION

Financial indicators reveal what governments commit; community evidence shows what people experience and value. Aligning the two strengthens credibility, legitimacy, and resilience. The People First Impact Method (P-FIM) demonstrates that when policy and finance reflect the lived reality of people—trust, relevance, and continuity—education is a stabilising force for recovery and sustainable peace across the Sahel. Education in the region is not merely a budget line; it is a moral and economic contract between governments and their people—and the most powerful route to long-term peace, dignity, economic prosperity, and trade.

International partners already finance a significant share of non-salary and crisis-related education spending in the Sahel, including most Education in Emergencies (EiE) interventions, while governments remain the primary funders of core recurrent costs. Rather than stepping back, the task is to use this funding more strategically, in line with what communities themselves prioritise. Donor finance protects education, especially EiE, as a public good and is cheaper than the long-term costs of instability and displacement that have regional and international dimensions. Used with clear benchmarks, transparency, and community accountability, it can be catalytic—embedding EiE in national budgets, strengthening systems, and encouraging greater domestic effort, rather than substituting for it.

**ANNEX 1 BURKINA FASO EDUCATION FINANCING 2023-2025 (CORE AND EiE)**

Indicator	SDG 4 Benchmark/Target	2023	Status	2024	Status	2025	Status	Source
Total Education budget (core, all subsectors) <sup>28</sup>	-	\$1.45bn / 870bn XOF	-	\$1.46bn / 872.8bn XOF	-	\$1.53bn / 915.7bn XOF	-	Finance Laws; IMF WEO 2025 (context); Loi de Finances Initiale (LFI) 2024 & 2025 (Law No. 042-2024/ALT)
MENAPLN <sup>29</sup> (Primary & Secondary)	-	\$670m/400 bn XOF(est.)	-	\$740 m / 447 bn XOF	-	\$780m / 469 bn XOF	-	LFI 2024 and 2025.
Education expenditure (% GDP)	4-6%	5.3% <sup>30</sup>	●	5.2 % TBD	●	5.0 % TBD	●	UNESCO UIS SDG4 Country Profile 2025 Indicator 1.a.2.
Education expenditure (% of gov't spending)	15-20%	20.3 %	●	20 %	●	20 %	●	UNESCO UIS SDG4 Country Profile 2025.
Government share (core education)	-	76%	-	74%	-	73%	-	GPE ITAP domestic financing matrix (for context).
Donor share (core education)	-	24%	-	26%	-	27%	-	GPE ITAP domestic financing matrix (for context).
EiE funding (total)	-	\$12.2m <sup>31</sup>	-	\$10.1m <sup>32</sup>	-	\$10.2m <sup>33</sup>	-	OCHA FTS 2023-2025
Government share (EiE)	-	_34	-	_35	-	_36	-	OCHA FTS 2023-2025
Donor share (EiE)	-	100%	-	100%	-	100%	-	OCHA FTS 2023-2025
Combined education + EiE total	-	\$1.46bn / 877.3 bn XOF	-	\$1.47bn/ 878.9 bn XOF	-	\$1.54 bn / 921.8 XOF	-	LFI 2024 & 2025; OCHA FTS 2023-2024

<sup>28</sup> IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database, April 2025 – GDP (current prices), Burkina Faso: 2023 \$ 21.18 bn; 2024 \$ 23.98 bn; 2025 \$ 27.06 bn.

<sup>29</sup> Ministry of Economy, Finance and Prospective (MINEFID) – Multi-annual Budget and Economic Framework Document (DPBEP 2025–2027, June 2024).

<sup>30</sup> UNESCO UIS SDG 4 Country Profile: Burkina Faso.

<sup>31</sup> \$6,723,685 paid | \$3,633,718 committed. \$62.4m HRP target.

<sup>32</sup> \$3,412,693 paid | \$6,655,992 committed. \$61.3m HRP target.

<sup>33</sup> \$6,951,534 paid | \$3,279,973 committed. \$43.4m HRP target.

<sup>34</sup> Government HRP 2023 funding \$3m to WFP for Food Security – no information whether this is school feeding.

<sup>35</sup> Government HRP 2025 funding \$5.5m being \$5,104,652m Progettomondo (Italian NGO) (health); \$370,753K Save the Children (nutrition); \$15,924K CERF.

<sup>36</sup> Government HRP 2025 funding \$857,718K to WFP for Food Security/Food Assistance – no information whether this is school feeding.

## ANNEX 2 CHAD EDUCATION FINANCING 2023-2025 (CORE AND EiE)

Indicator	SDG 4 Benchmark/Target	2023	Status	2024	Status	2025	Status	Sources
Total Education budget (all subsectors)	-	\$419m <sup>37</sup> / 255.6bn XAF	-	\$530.5m / 323.6bn XAF	-	\$628.6m / 383.4bn XAF	-	<a href="#">Chad Finance Laws 2023–2025</a> ; <a href="#">IMF WEO 2025</a>
MENPC (Primary & Secondary)	-	\$231m/ 141.2bn XAF	-	\$273m/ 166.4bn XAF	-	\$295.1m / 180.0 bn XAF	-	Chad Finance Laws 2023–2025 (MENPC chapter)
Education expenditure (% GDP)	4–6%	3.2%	●	2.2 – 2.6%	○TBD	2.2 – 2.6%	○TBD	<a href="#">UNESCO UIS SDG 4 Profile 2025</a> ; GPE ITAP 2023; IMF WEO 2025
Education expenditure (% of government spending)	15–20%	16.5 <sup>38%</sup>	●	16.5%	○TBD	16.5%	○TBD	UNESCO UIS SDG 4 Profile 2025; GPE ITAP 2023; Chad Finance Law 2023; IMF WEO Apr 2025
Government funding (core education)	-	90%	-	90%	-	90%	-	Chad Finance Laws 2023–2025; GPE TAP 2023; IMF WEO 2025
Donor funding (core education)	-	10%	-	10%	-	10%	-	Chad Finance Laws 2023–2025
EiE financing (total)	-	\$15.1m <sup>39</sup>	-	\$9.2m <sup>40</sup>	-	\$11.9m <sup>41</sup>	-	<a href="#">OCHA FTS</a>
Government share (EiE)	-	\$347k <sup>42</sup>	-	\$51.1k <sup>43</sup>	-	– <sup>44</sup>	-	OCHA FTS; HRP Chad 2023–2025
Donor share (EiE)	-	\$14.7m	-	\$9.1m	-	100%	-	OCHA FTS
Combined education + EiE total	-	\$434.1 m	-	\$539.7 m	-	\$640.5 m	-	Calculated (total education + EiE); UIS + FTS + Finance Laws

<sup>37</sup> 610 XAF = 1 USD.

<sup>38</sup> 9.1% Primary and Secondary Education.

<sup>39</sup> \$22.3m HRP target.

<sup>40</sup> \$28.1m HRP target.

<sup>41</sup> \$11.9m total - Paid (US\$8,229,609) and committed (US\$3,761,074). \$35.8m HRP target.

<sup>42</sup> \$59.9m total project budget multi-sector refugee response fund managed by UNHCR.

<sup>43</sup> \$52.m total project budget multi-sector refugee response fund managed by UNHCR.

<sup>44</sup> Government HRP funding \$24.6m to WFP for food security & nutrition to address severe food insecurity during the lean season.

**ANNEX 3 MALI EDUCATION FINANCING 2023-2025 (CORE AND EiE)**

Indicator	SDG 4 <sup>45</sup> Benchmark/Target	2023	Status	2024	Status	2025	Status	Sources
Total Education budget (all subsectors)	-	590 bn XOF (\$1.04 bn)	-	600 bn XOF (\$1.06 bn)	-	597.5 bn XOF (\$1.06 bn)	-	<a href="#">Finance Laws</a> ; Budget Citoyen 2024 & 2025 (MEF); UNESCO UIS SDG 4 Mali 2025; GPE ITAP 2023; <a href="#">IMF WEO 2025</a> .
MEN <sup>46</sup> (Primary & Secondary)	-	TBC	-	TBC	-	TBC	-	<a href="#">Finance Laws</a>
Education expenditure (% GDP)	4-6%	4.2 %	●	4.4 %	●	4.0 %	●	<a href="#">Finance Laws</a> ; Budget Citoyen 2024 & 2025 (MEF); UNESCO UIS SDG 4 Mali 2025; GPE ITAP 2023; <a href="#">IMF WEO 2025</a> .
Education expenditure (% of government spending)	15-20%	19.1 %	●	17.8 %	●	18.5 %	●	<a href="#">Finance Laws</a> ; Budget Citoyen 2024 & 2025 (MEF); UNESCO UIS SDG 4 Mali 2025; GPE ITAP 2023; <a href="#">IMF WEO 2025</a> .
Government funding (core education)	-	95%	-	95%	-	95%	-	<a href="#">Finance Laws</a> ; Budget Citoyen 2024 & 2025 (MEF); UNESCO UIS SDG 4 Mali 2025; GPE ITAP 2023; <a href="#">IMF WEO 2025</a> .
Donor funding (core education)	-	5%	-	5%	-	5%	-	<a href="#">Finance Laws</a> ; Budget Citoyen 2024 & 2025 (MEF); UNESCO UIS SDG 4 Mali 2025; GPE ITAP 2023; <a href="#">IMF WEO 2025</a> .
EiE (total)	-	\$10.1m <sup>47</sup>	-	\$8.3m <sup>48</sup>	-	\$7.8m <sup>49</sup>	-	<a href="#">OCHA FTS 2023-2025</a>
Government share (EiE)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<a href="#">OCHA FTS 2023-2025</a>
Donor share (EiE)	-	100%	-	100%	-	100%	-	<a href="#">OCHA FTS 2023-2025</a>
Combined education + EiE total	-	\$ 1.04 bn + 10.1 m = \$ 1.05 bn	-	\$ 1.06 bn + 8.3 m = \$ 1.07 bn	-	\$ 1.09 bn + 7.8 m = \$1.10 bn	-	<a href="#">OCHA FTS 2023-2025</a>

<sup>45</sup> Sustainable Development Goal 4 (Education) benchmark.

<sup>46</sup> MEN - Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale.

<sup>47</sup> US\$5,679,475 paid | US\$4,461,444 committed. \$96.3m HRP target.

<sup>48</sup> US\$5,103,522 paid | US\$3,254,531 committed. \$71.5m HRP target.

<sup>49</sup> US\$4,159,539 paid | US\$3,608,091 committed. \$70.2m HRP target.

**ANNEX 4 MAURITANIA EDUCATION FINANCING 2023-2025 (CORE AND EiE)**

Indicator / Component	SDG 4 Benchmark/Target	2023	Status	2024	Status	2025	Status	Source
Total education budget (all subsectors)	-	MRU 5.17 bn (\$130 m)	-	MRU 5.80 bn (\$146 m)	-	MRU 6.10 bn (\$153 m)	-	MoF (2025)
MENRSE (Primary & Secondary)	-	MRU 3.6 bn (\$90 m)	-	MRU 4.0 bn (\$100 m)	-	MRU 4.3 bn (\$108 m)	-	MoF (2025)
Education expenditure (% of GDP)	4-6%	2.8 %	●	3.1 % (proj.)	●	2.9 % (proj.)	●	GPE ITAP (2024); UNESCO UIS; MoF (2025)
Education expenditure (% of government spending)	15-20%	12.0 %	●	15.8 % (proj.)	●	15.9 % (proj.)	●	GPE ITAP (2024); UNESCO UIS; MoF (2025)
Government share (core education)	-	88 %	-	87 %	-	86 %	-	MoF (2025)
Donor share (core education)	-	12 %	-	13 %	-	14 %	-	MoF (2025)
EiE / Humanitarian financing (total)	-	\$1.9 m	-	\$0.7 m	-	\$0.14 m	-	UNHCR; OCHA FTS (2024-2025); ECW
Government share (EiE / refugee inclusion)	-	10 % (\$0.19 m)	-	12 % (\$0.08 m)	-	15 % (\$0.02 m)	-	MENRSE; UNHCR (2024)
Donor share (EiE / refugee inclusion)	-	90 % (\$1.71 m)	-	88 % (\$0.62 m)	-	85 % (\$0.12 m)	-	UNHCR; OCHA FTS (2024-2025); ECW
Combined education + EiE total	-	\$132 m	-	\$147 m	-	\$153 m	-	UNESCO UIS; GPE ITAP (2024); MoF (2025); UNHCR

## ANNEX 5 NIGER EDUCATION FINANCING 2023-2025<sup>50</sup> (CORE AND EiE)

Indicator	SDG 4 Benchmark/Target	2023	Status	2024	Status	2025	Status	Source
Total Education budget (all subsectors)	-	\$423 m / 420 bn XOF	-	\$973m / 584 bn XOF (target)	-	\$1.1bn / 667 bn XOF (target)	-	MoF LFR 2023 / Execution reports; UIS SDG4 Profile; MoF T1 2024 (Ord. 2024-001); MoF T2 2025 (Ord. 2024-59); GPE ITAP 2023.
MEN (Primary & Secondary) <sup>51</sup>	-	\$313m / 188 bn XOF (indicative)	-	\$720m / 432 bn XOF (indicative)	-	\$823m / 494 bn XOF (indicative)	-	GPE ITAP 2023.
Education expenditure (% GDP)	4-6%	4.1%	●	5.8% (target)	-	5.6% (target)	-	UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), SDG4 Country Profile 2025.
Education expenditure (% of gov't spending)	15-20%	12.8%	●	22% (target, excl. debt)	-	22% (target, excl. debt)	-	GPE ITAP 2023.
Government share (core education)	-	85%	-	80%	-	75%	-	GPE ITAP 2023.
Donor share (core education)	-	15%	-	20%	-	25%	-	MoF T1 2024 and T2 2025 Execution Reports.
EiE financing	-	\$10.9m <sup>52</sup>	-	\$27.1m <sup>53</sup>	-	\$21.6m <sup>54</sup>	-	<u>OCHA FTS 2023-2025</u>
Gov't share (EiE)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	OCHA FTS 2023-2025
Donor share (EiE)	-	100%	-	100%	-	100%	-	OCHA FTS 2023-2025
Combined education + EiE	-	\$711m / 427 bn XOF	-	\$1 bn / 600 bn XOF	-	\$1.13 bn / 680 bn XOF	-	OCHA FTS 2023-2025

<sup>50</sup> \$1USD / 600 XOF.

<sup>51</sup> MEN - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale.

<sup>52</sup> \$3,430,330 paid | \$7,440,630 committed. HRP target \$41.1m.

<sup>53</sup> \$22,057,190 paid | \$5,056,633 committed. HRP target \$42m.

<sup>54</sup> \$25.3m HRP target.

## ANNEX 6

The table below shows how financial and social indicators can be integrated.

Dimension	Financial Analysis	P-FIM Contribution	Combined Value
Evidence Type	Quantitative - GDP shares, allocations	Lived experience / alternative valid knowledge sources / Community priorities & capacities	Fuller accountability
Accountability	Upward to ministries/donors	Downward to communities / teachers / students	Two-way trust
Focus	Inputs and efficiency	Impact, meaning, motivation, relevance	Integrated results
Change Pathway	Planned and linear	Emergent and relational	Added value approach / Adaptive learning / course correction

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